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Reform of Ghana's macropolicies has helped to create a more
favorable business environment and a "level playing field" for
the private sector. At this point, instead of further refining its
policies, Ghana should begin strengthening the institutions to
implement them, and improving the channels of communication
between government and the private sector.
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Pubil  SecorMnagemenl
and Private  Sector  Development
This private sector assessment of Ghana - Incentives for private investment have been
confined to Ghana's industry sector because of  strengthened but the investnent  approval
limited data - concludes, among other things,  process must be speeded up and prior laws and
that:  regulations must be revised and brought in line
with the new code. The case for reducing the
Reform of Ghana's  macropolicy environ-  Investment Code's bias toward capital-intensive
ment has helped to create a more favorable  investments, for example, should be reviewed.
business environment and a "level playing field"
for the private sector.  Reforms have reduced  The govemrrnent  must learn to communicate
entry barriers (except in labor) and encouraged  new policies and decisions fully to potential
greater competition in the industry sector.  Much  investors - whose confidence in Ghana's
remains to be done, but important steps have  stability and policies remains a problem, partly
been taken toward improving communications  because of inad  quate dialogue between the
and transport infrastructure.  private sector and the government.
Important institutional constraints remain,  Donors should focus more on core support
however.  At this junctulre,  instead of further  and on the long-term actions needed for institu-
refining its policies, Ghana should establish a  tions to grow and survive.
priority of strengthening its institutions and its
capacity to support long-term private sector  Several steps go into a fiil
1 scale private
investnent  and production.  Institutions to  sector assessment:
provide support services to the private sector -
including credit, technology acquisition, invest-  *  An overview of the nature and scope of the
ment promotion, adaptive research, training, and  country's private sector.
quality control - are weak in Ghana, and the
policies to strengthen them must be thought  *  A review of the polic.es, laws, and regula-
through.  tions affecting the sector(s) to be assessed -
and of the capacity of the public institutions
In panicular, Ghana needs new institutional  responsible for planning and implementing
mechanisms for mobilizing resources and for  them.
improving the availability and allocation of
credit.  The current credit squeeze has favored  *  An assessment of the operating legal
short-term trading operations over long-term  system and practices that affect the private
investment - and prospects for genuine long-  sector (this was omitted for this assessment).
term investment seem bleak.  The lack of credit
for new, small- and medium-scale entrepreneurs  *  A review of the private sector's common
is the single most "felt" constraint on Ghana's  service institutions and of its channels for
private sector.  dialogue with the government.
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on an earlier version of this  paper.SUMMARY  OF FINDINGS  AND  RECOMMENDATIONS
*  This  paper  reports  the  findings  of an assessment  of the
constraints  on the  private  sector  and  the  directional  changes
required  for  its  development  in Ghana. The  exercise  was a pilot
test  of the  approach  proposed  in  the  Initiating  Brief  on Private
Segtor  Assessment  (CECPS,  1987). It  was  planned  as a low  cost
effort  (17  staffweeks)  to  be completed  in  six  months. In  view  of
data  limitations,  thie  assessment  was confined  to the  industry
sector  of Ghana.
Judged  by the  criteria  of the  shares  of GDP  and  employment,
Ghana's  economy  is  dominated  by the  private  sector  in spite  of the
rapid  expansion  of the  public  sector  since  the  1960s. Very
little,  however,  is  known  about  the  performance  of the  private
sector  due to  severe  data  limitations.
*  Recent  policy  reforms  in  Ghana  have  created  a more  favorable
business  environment  and  the  foundation  for  a "level  playing
field"  for  the  private  sector. Important  steps  have  been taken  to
restore  private  sector  confidence  in the  economy. The  incentives
for  local  and  foreign  private  investment  have  been improved,  and
guarantees  against  expropriation  have  been  put in  place  through  a
new investment  code.  Inspite  of these  improvements,  however,
government-private  sector  dialogue  remains  a  weak  spot in  Ghana.- ii  -
*  In  general,  the  private  sector  in  Ghana  is likely  to  be held  back'
more  by institutional  constraints  than  by policy  inadequactes.
While  the  Government  has done  much to remove  the  key  policy
constraints  inhibiting  overall  private  sector  development,
institutional  constraints  in the  financial  sector  and  the  lack  of
support  services  to the  private  sector  in important  respects
remain  serious  problems. It is  also  clear  that  new  and small
scale  enterprises  are  hurt  more  severely  by these  constraints  than
established  and large  scale  enterprises.  At this  juncture,
Ghana's  priority  should  be to  strengthen  its  institutions  and
implementation  capacity  to  support  the  private  sector  rathei.  than
to further  refine  its  policies.
*  The  most severe  constraint  on the  private  sector  in  Ghana  pertains
to credit  availability  and  allocation  to the  formal  manufacturing
sector. To a large  extent,  this  problem  reflects  the  short-term
conflict  between  the  objectives  of stabilization  and  growth. In
terms  of action,  therefore,  the  first  priority  should  be to  reform
the  financial  institutions  and  credit  policy  so  as to  augment  the
supply  of resources  for  long-term  investment  and  production. The
small  scale  subsector  whose  access  to  the  formal  credit  system
remains  limited  deserves  special  attention  in  this  regard.  The
speedy  development  of indigenous  business  enterprises  will require
new  institutional  mechanisms  and  facilities  to  ensure  efficient
and  equitable  access  to  credit  for  the  small  and  medium  scale
local  entrepreneurs.- ili  -
*  The  implementation  of the  new  investment  code  has  been hampered  by
a failure  to iealign  existing  laws,  regulations  and institutions
with the  provisions  of the  code.  Complex  regulations  administered
by multiple  agencies  are  a particular  constraint  on the  small  and
medium  scale  industries.  Thus,  a further  priority  is the  earliest
possible  elimination  of  the  regulatory  impediments,  both  formal
and  informal,  inhibiting  new  investments.  The  starting  point  here
should  be to  review  earlier  sector-specific  legislation  governing
certain  ministries  which  continue  to  conflict  with the  Code.
Based  on this  review,  such  legislation  should  be abrogated  or
amended  so that  the  processing  of investment  approvals  can  proceed
smoothly. Immediate  steps  should  also  be taken  to strengthen  the
Ghana  Investment  Centre's  (GIC)  capacity  for  investment  promotion
both locally  and  abroad. The  GIC should  be encouraged  to  utilize
the  assistance  offered  by the  Bank  and  the  Irish  Development
Authority  to  meet these  needs.
*  The  new Investment  Code  has  now  been in  operation  for  about  three
years. The third  priority  action  in  support  of the  private  sector
is  to review  its  provisions  and  regulations  together  with those
relating  to relevant  ministries  (e.g.,  Industry,  Agriculture
including  Fisheries,  Trade,  Transport,  Tourism,  NRS,  etc.),  in
order  (i)  to identify  the  sections  of the  Code  which  require
amendments  or subsidiary  legislation  so as to improve  the
processing  of investment  proposals,  and (ii)  to revise  the  Code
and  its  regulations  in  light  of the  findings. This review  could- iv  -
be used  also  for  modifying  the  nature  and  scope  of incentives.
For  example,  the  case  for  reducing  the  Code's  bias in  favor  of
capital  intensive  investments  could  be re-examined  in the  course
of the  review;  the  relevance  of some  of the  incentives  in  light  of
the  recent  tax  and tariff  reforms  also  needs  to  be reviewed.
*  The  assessment  of the  individual  institutions  presented  in  this
report  is  based  on existing  documentation  and  very limited
fieldwork. Several  public  institutions  are identified  as critical
to  private  sector  development.  The  next  and  very important  step
is to assess  their  institutional  capacities  and to strengthen  them
to  play their  redefined  roles. The fourth  priority,  therefore,  is
to complete  a systematic  assessment  of the  key  public  institutions
(building  on existing  studies  where  available),  and to  propose  a
phased  plan  for  their  reform. The  plan should  include  a
redefinition  of the  objectives  of each  institution,  the  redesign
of their  tasks  and  organization  structures,  the  elimination  of
superfluous  functions,  and  proposals  for  their  staff  development.
*  The public  institutions  discussed  in this  report  are  unlikely  to
become  strong  and  useful  aids  to the  private  sector  unless  an
integrated  view is taken  of their  long-term  needs  and  the
strategies  for  their  development  are  carefully  planned  and
supported. The  fifth  priority,  therefore,  is  to encourage  don_rs
to take  a long-term  view  of the  needs  of the  key  public
institutions  concerned. Sustainability  of institutions  should  bethe  primary  criterion  for  donor  assistance. In the  past,  donors,
including  the  Bank,  have offered  piece-meal  support  to these
agencies  for  activities  of special  interest  to them. Donor
strategy  should  now focus  more  sharply  on the  core  support  and
long-term  actions  required  for  the  survival  and  growth  of the
institutions.
*  Barriers  to  entry  and  exit  which  stem  from  the  less  visible,
"informal"  regulatory  constraints  in  Ghana  deserves  careful
attention. There  is  evidence  to show  that  the  labor  market,  in
particular,  suffers  from  this  malady  in  contrast  to product
markets  which  have  moved  more  decisively  towards  liberalization.
A systematic  assessment  of the  impact  of the  labor  market's
regulatory  framework  on the  private  sector  and  of the  reforms
required  to improve  the  functioning  of this  market  is in  order.
*  The existing  three  yrivate  sector  associations  should  be
encouraged  to set  up suitable  institutional  mechanisms  to
undertake  serious  studies  of their  common  problems  and  to  use them
to dialogue  with the  Government.  There  is  a case  for  developing
their  capacity  to  play  a proactive  role  in this  area,  especially
in the  absence  of autonomous  policy  research  institutions.  One
option  is to  set  up a private  foundation  under  the  auspices  of the
associations  and  finance  it through  industry  contributions.
Research  and  publication  activities  could  then  be organized
through  the  foundation.  This  will  enable  the  associations  to tap- vi  -
the  expertise  available  in the  country  and  to undertake  studies  on
current  policy  issues  and  disseminate  or use  their  findings  to
influence  policies  of relevance  to the  pt.vate  sector. Private
sector-government  dialogue  should  be seen  as an important  part  of
the  process  of building  up private  sector  confidence  in  Ghana.
*  S,mall  scale  industries  should  be encouraged  to establish  their  own
association  for  collaborative  action  and  dialogue  with the
Government,  and  to  provide  information  and  advisory  services  to
members  in  different  regions.  At  present,  there  is  no  forum  for
the  small  scale  entrepreneurs  to  get  together  and  to  make  their
voice  heard  by the  Government.  An  association  of  small  scale
industries,  as and  when  created,  will  also  need to  have  a regional
presence  as its  members  will  be located  in  different  parts  of the
country.
*  The  Ghana  exercise  confirmed  the  usefulness  of the  approach  and
guidelines  proposed  in the  Initiating  Brief. Among  its
methodological  implications  for  such  assessments  in  other
countries  are  the  usefulness  of separate  working  groups  for
different  segments  of  the  private  sector  if  a  comprehensive
assessment  is  envisaged,  the  importance  of the  government's
interest  and  cooperation  in the  exercise,  and  the  key role  of
private  entrepreneurs  and  managers  as a source  of data  and  ideas
for  action. The  Bank's  considerable  economic  and  sector  work  on
Ghana  made it  possible  to  complete  the  assessment  at low  cost in
spite  of the  data  limitations  encountered  in  the  field.PRIVATE  SECTOR  ASSESSMENT:
A Pilot  Exercise  with  Res2tct  to Ghana
The  purpose  of this  paper  is  to report  on  an assessment  of the
private  sector  in  Ghana  which  was undertaken  by the  Public  Sector
Management  and  Private  Sector  Development  Division  (CECPS)  during  FY88.
The  rationale  of this  pilot  exercise  is twofold: First  of all,  given  the
vastness  of the  private  sector  in  many  countries,  it is  necessary  to test
the  concept  of private  sector  assessment  in the  field  in  order  to set
limits  to its  scope. Second,  a pilot  effort  is  useful  to  generate
experience  in  conducting  the  assessment  with speed  and  economy. In
general,  this  exercise  has followed  the  approach  and  methodological
guidelines  proposed  in  Private  Sector  Assessment: An Initiating  Brief
(See  Annex  1 for  details).
The first  six  sections  of the  paper  deal  with  different  aspects  of
the  assessments  of the  private  sector  in  Ghana  and  the  findings  of the
exercise. Section  I of the  paper  outlines  the  objectives  and  scope  of the
assessment  exercise,  and  the  reasons  for  the  choice  of  Ghana  for  this  pilot
effort. Section  II  provides  a  brief  overview  of the  private  sector  in
Ghana  based  largely  on the  work of a local  consultant  commissioned  for  this-2-
purpose. Ghana's  policies,  laws  and regulations  affecting  the  private
sector,  its  public  institutions  relevant  to  private  sector  development,  and
its  private  sector  institutions  for  collaborative  action  and  dialogue  are
then  assessed  in  Sections  III,  IV  and  V, respectively.  All  of these
interrelated  components  are  examined  with special  reference  to the  industry
segment  of the  private  sector  which  is  the  focus  of the  detailed
assessment. The  conclusions  of the  exercise  are  presented  in  Section  VI.
Some  of the  methodological  lessons  of this  exercise  and  their  implications
for  private  sector  assessments  elsewhere  are  discussed  in the  last  section
which  will  be of special  interest  to those  who  wish to  undertake  or fine
private  sector  assessment  in  other  countries.
I.  The  Objectives  and  Scope  of Private  Sector  Agsessmet
Private  Sector  Assessment  (PSA)  is a form  of sector  work  which
could  provide  useful  insights  to  country  governments  with  a strong  interest
in  private  sector  development  (PSD). If countries  seek  external  assistance
for  PSD,  the  Bank's  Country  Departments  may  use PSA  as a tool  to  assist
interested  governments  in the  formulation  of country  strategies  for  PSD. A
strategy  for  PSD  should  be firmly  grounded  in a careful  assessment  of the
constraints  on the  private  sector  and  a sound  understanding  of the  feasible
options  and the  resources  required  to  promote  its  development. In  general,
PSA is  designed  to achieve  the  following  object:ves:l (1)  to  provide  an
overview  of the  nature  and  scope  of the  .ivate  sector  in the  selected
1/ PSA Initiating  Brief (Annex  1)  p. 6-7.3-
country,  as a  basis  for  choosing  priority  areas  or issues  pertaining  to the
private  sector  for  detailed  diagnosis;  (2)  to identify  the  strengths  and
weaknesses  of the  totality  or selected  segments  of the  private  sector
depending  on the  outcome  of (1)  above;  and (3)  to  suggest  the  directions
for  change  and  possible  approaches  to strengthening  PSD in  light  of the
foregoing  diagnosis. The  extent  to  which  each  of these  objectives  is
achieved  through  PSA  will  depend  very  much  on the  scope  of the  exercise  and
the  resources,  skills  and  time  available  to  complete  it.
Private  Sector  Development  is sometimes  viewed  as pertaining  to
the  realm  of organlzed  industry  and  commerce  alone. From  a  national
perspective,  it is appropriate  to  broaden  the  scope  of the  exercise  to
include  all  areas  or sectors  of activity  in  which  private  initiative  and
participation  have a  useful  role.  In  most  countries,  the  private  sector
has  relevance  not  only  to industry,  finance  and  trade  but  also  to
agriculture,  education,  health  and  other  social  services. All these  large
scale,  organized  activities  may coexist  in  some  countries  with  a wide  range
of informal  activities  which  operate  almost  as an  underground  economy
beyond  the  pale of law. While  it is  possible  to limit  the  scope  of  private
sector  assessment  to a  single  sector,  subsector,  or a sectoral  issue  (e.g.,
small  industry  sector,  regulatory  framework,  infrastructure,  etc.),  there
is  considerable  merit  in starting  with  a  broad  overview  of the  private
sector  as a basis  for  prioritizing  its  constraints,  needs  and their
linkages. Specific  problems  for  in-depth  diagnosis  could  then  be chosen
within  this  framework. In the  absence  of a systematic  overview,  the
exercise  could  well  be driv  n by pre-conceived  notions  of private  sector
constraints  and  needs.-4-
Four  elements  were identified  in  the  PSA  Initiating  Brief  as the
key  factors  influencing  PSD  in any  country. These  are  the  policies,  laws
and  regulations  affecting  private  sector  activities,  the  capacity  and
quality  of management  of the  public  institutions  implementing  policies,
laws  and  regulations,  the  quality  and  dynamism  of the  private  sector
institutions  which  provide  common  services  to their  constituents,  and  the
operating  legal  system  of the  country. It  was  decided  that  the  pilot  PSA
exercise  in  Ghana  should  explore  these  basic  factors  as further  defined
below,  subject  to the  availability  of data. At the  conclusion  of the
general  overview  of the  private  sector,  however,  it  was felt that  the
exercise  should  focus  more  on the  first  three  factors. The  fourth,  namely,
the  operating  legal  system,  called  for  more  detailed  fieldwork  than  the
present  exercise  could  provide  or afford. Aspects  of the  legal  system
directly  pertinent to PSD (e.S., investment laws, tax laws, etc.), however,
have  been  examined  here,  but  not the  more  basic  and  pervasive  legal
constraints  (e.g.,  those  pertaining  to land  tenure  laws,  criminal  law,
property  rights,  etc.).
Policies.  Laws  and  Reaulations
In the  developing  world,  inappropriate  policies  pose two  types  of
barriers  to the  progress  of the  private  sector:  (1)  conventional  barriers
to  entry  and  exit  which  tend  to limit  potential  competition  and  protect  the
beneficiaries  of the  system  at the  expense  of society  at large;  and  (2)
physical  controls  on the  acquisition  of technoiogy,  capital  and raw5-
materials  which  tend  to  cause  allocational  and  x-inefficiencies.  The
removal  of such  barriers  inevitably  calls  for  a reform  of the  country's
basic  economic  policies. Furthermore,  PSD  may  not  occur  without
governments  taking  the  initiative  to provide  positive  incentives  and
assistance  to local  entrepreneurs.  Thus  stability  of  policies  and  a
reasonable  assurance  of a fair  return  or reward.for  investment  and  labor
tend  to act  as incentives  for  the  private  sector  to  perform  better. For
example,  even  when  entry  barriers  are  removed,  but taxes  are  too  high  or a
threat  of expropriation  of assets  exists,  incentives  for  PSD  get  weakened.
Similarly,  PSD  requires  policies  and  programs  that  facilitate  the
provision  of infrastructural  facilities;  development  of the  capital  market
and  related  institutions  which  provide  funds  and  financial  services,  and
the  supply  of skilled  manpower. Needless  to say,  in  extremely  poor and
small  countries,  private  entrepreneurship  and  managerial  capacity  tend  to
be scarce  resources  and the  removal  of  barriers  or  provision  of incentives
may  not  bring  about  indigenous  PSD in  the  short  run in  such  settings. In
such  cases,  there  is clearly  a  need  for  a longer  term  perspective  on PSD,
and  a willingness  to invest  in the  needed  infrastructure  and  to create
opportunities  for  learning  through  innovative  forms  of assistance  and  of
partnership  between  countries  and  external  donors  or  collaborators.
Public  Sector  Institutions
An important  component  of  a supportive  institutional  framework  is
the  capacity  of the  country's  public  institutions,  both  economic  and-6-
financial,  to  plan and  implement  the  government's  policies,  programs  and
infrastructural  services  relevant  to  the  private  sector. Given  the
realities  of the  developing  world,  an exclusive  focus  on policy  reform  as  a
means  to achieve  PSD is  an inadequate  arproach  to PSD.  In some  countries,
the  liberalization  of policies,  has led  to the  lifting  of entry  barriers,
deregulation  of previously  controlled  activities  including  financial
operations,  and  restructured  public  investment  policies. But
liberalization  does  not  necessarily  lead  to an  end  of all  regulations. For
example,  where  market  power  is a  problem,  governments  need  to  play  a
regulatory  role.  Public  agencies  may  be required  in  almost  all  cases  to
monitor  and  assist  the  process  of PSD. There  is  considerable  evidence  to
show  that  even  when  policies  aie  well conceived,  the  faulty  design  of laws,
regulations,  programs  and  procedures,  and  their  poor implementation  by
public  agencies,  tend  to  have  an adverse  impact  on PSD.  Regulations  and
the  procedures  for  their  implementetion  may  be so cumbersome  and time
consuming  from  the  standpoint  of entrepreneurs  that they  are  frustrated  and
turn  to the  underground  economy  and  other  shortcuts  which  tend to  breed
corruption. It is for  these  reasons  that  attention  should  be paid  not only
to the  adequacy  of the  policy  and  regulatory  framework  but  also  the
capacity  and incentives  of the  public  institutions  that implement  it.
Private  Sector  Institutions
There  are,  of c^urse,  limits  to  the  extent  to  which  public  sector
institutions  can  be reformed. Established  traditions  and  ways of  doing
business,  vested  interests  of  powerful  groups  and  the  lack  of  pressure  from-7-
users/clients  for  greater  public  accountability  are  factors  which  tend  to
delay  the  process  of reform. On the  other  hand,  where  an organized  private
sector  exists  (e.g.  industrial  or commercial  enterprises,  NGOs,  etc.),  it
is  possible  for its  members  to  have  an influence  on the  policy  and
institutional  environments  of their  countries  through  collaborative  action.
Such  collective  endeavors  may  take  the  form  of:  (a)  representative
organizations  such  as chambers  of commerce  and  small  industry  associations;
(b)  problem  solving  and  policy  advisory  groups  such  as private  foundations
and  consultancy  organizations  (such  private  organizations  exist  in several
Latin  American  and  Asian  countries);  (c)  professional  associations  which
uphold  standards  and  educate  their  members  (e.g.,  associations  of
accountants,  auditors,  engineers,  managers,  etc.);  (d)  resource  mobilizing
and  allocating  bodies  such  as stock  exchanges  and  private  financial
institutions;  and (e)  consumer  related  movements  which  demand  service  and
quality. The  case  for  strengthening  their  role in  LDCs is  all  the  greater
as they  could  be an important  aid to  PSD  through  their  influence  on the
policy  and institutional  environment  in  which  they  operate  and  the  sense  of
self  reliance  they  help engender  in  the  private  sector  through
collaborative  action. Needless  to  say,  there  is the  risk  that  the
organized  private  sector  may  use its  influence  against  much  needed  policy
reforms  or to  protect  its  sectional  interests,  and  governments  need  to  be
alert  to keep  such  tendencies  in  check.-8-
The  Ooerating  Legal  System
Inadequacies  in the  operating  legal  system  of a country  often
prevent  the  effective  implementation  of its  policies,  laws  and  regulations.
They  have adverse  effects  on  many sectors  of private  economic  activity.
Gaps in the  basic  legal  framework  necessary  for  PSD  including  property
rights  (ownership,  transfer  and  bankruptcy),  contractual  rights,  law  of
associations,  criminal  law,  labor  laws,  problems  of dispute settlement  and
enforcement  of  law,  etc.,  can  have  adverse  motivational  effects  on
entrepreneurs,  and impair  the  efficient  operation  of markets. Furthermore,
inefficiencies  in the  administration  and  enforcement  of the  law  tend  to
cause  a crisis  of  public  confidence  as it is the  observed  administration  of
law  that  influences  public  behavior. Hence,  gaps  in the  "operating"  legal
system  may  well shed  light  on the  reasons  for  the  poor  performance  of
markets,  the  weak response  of  entrepreneurs  and  the  failure  to  mobilize
capital  in a given  country.
The recent  report  of the  Review  Group  on Private  Sector
Development  (World  Bank,  June  1988)  has identified  social  and  physical
infrastructure  as one  of the  seven  factors  which  contribute  to the  enabling
environment  required  for  PSD. 2 In the  present  exercise,  the  first  round
of interviews  with  private  entrepreneurs  did  not identify  that
2/  The PSA  Initiatinf  Brief  treats  infrastructure  under  two  of the  four
factors,  namely,  policies,  and  public  sector  institutions.9-
S.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~J
infrastructure  was'a  major  constraint.  This is  not to say  that
infrastructure  will  not  emerge  as a  barrier  to PSD  in  Ghana  in the  future:
however,  a judgement  was  made,  as explained  in a later  section,  that  it
need  not  be assessed  in depth  at this  stage.
Why  Ghana?
Ghana  was  selected  for  the  pilot  exercise  for  several  reasons.
First  of '.1,  the  Government  of  Ghana  (GOG)  had declared  its  intention  to
promote  PSD.  The  Economic  Recovery  Program  of Ghana  therefore  included  a
number  of  policy  reforms  and  related  actions  to strengthen  the  private
sector  and  to augment  the  incentives  available  to  potential  private
investors,  both foreign  and indigenous.  GOG  was thus  perceived  to  be
supportive  of PSD;  it  was  also  willing  to collaborate.  in the  PSA  exercise.
Second,  the  Bank  Group  had  already  done  a fair  amount  of work  relevant  to
PSD in  Ghana. Though  major  information  gaps  still  existei  in  Ghana,  it  was
felt  that  more  data  and  diagnostic  evidence  was available  on different
dimensions  of the  private  sector  in  Ghana  than  in  many  other  Sub-Saharan
African  countries. Third,  when the  PSA  exercise  was  being  planned  in  FY88,
the  Bank  and  GOG  were in  dialogue  on Structural  Adjustment  Credit  II (SAC
II).  Since  both  parties  agreed  that  PSD  should  be a component  in  SAC  II,
the  Country  Department  concerned  (AF4)  welcomed  the  opportunity  to
undertake  the  pilot  PSA  exercise  and  supported  it  by allocating  the
necessary  resources  jointly  with CECPS. Thus the  active  interest  and
support  of the  Bank's  Couptry  Department  and  of GOG  were  major  factors  that
led  to the  choice  of  Ghana  for  the  pilot  PSA  exercise.- 10  -
II.  An Overview  of Ghana's  Private  Sector
Ghana  had a gross  domestic  product  (GDP)  of $5720  million  in 1986.3
Agriculture,  livestock  and fishing  accounted  for  51  percent  of the  GDP in
1986  followed  by trade  (11.1  percent)  and  manufacturing  (9  percent). The
distribution  of  GDP  by major  activity  and  by ownership  (public  vs.  private)
is given  in  Table  1.  In 1986,  for  example,  64.3  percent  of the  GDP  was
generated  by the  private  sector. This is  admittedly  a crude  estimate  based
on certain  assumptions  and informed  judgements  about  the  economy  which  are
explained  in  Table  1.  According  to  The  Census  of 1984,  Ghana's  population
w-- 12.3  million  and  the  private  sector's  phare  of employment  in that  year
was  89.7  percent  of the  5.4  million  gainfully  employed  labor  force. 4 The
private  sector's  share  of employment  was the  highest  in  Agriculture  (97.6
percent),  followed  by wholesale  and  retail  trade  (97  percent)  and
manufacturing  (95  percent). Table  2  provides  fuller  details  of the
distribution  of employment.  Even  when agriculture  is  excluded,  the  private
sector  accounted  for  77.5  percent  of the  total  employment  in 1984.
An overview  of the  structure  and  relative  importance  of the
private  sector  in the  major  segments  of activity  i.n  Ghana  is  presented
below. A systematic  disaggregation  of the  economy  to  highlight  the  private
3/  The  data reported  in this  section  are  based  on the  consultant  report  The
Private  Sector  in the  Economy  of  Ghana,  May 1988.
4/ Employment  data for  1986  were not  available  for  the  economy  as a  whole.-:  13 -
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sector's  role  has not  been  possible  mainly  because  of data  limitations.
The  following  account  is therefore  selective  and  deals  with those  segments
and  dimensions  of the  private  sector  for  which  data  were readily  available:
A  more  detailed  analysis  of the  subsectors  is  provided  in  Annex  II.
The  sectors  of  Ghana's  economy  which  have  varying  degrees  of
private  participation  are  agriculture,  mining  and  quarrying,  manufacturing,
utilities,  construction,  trade,  transport  and  communications,  finance,
insurance  and  related  services,  health,  and  education. 5 The relative
importance  of the  private  sector  in these  activities  could  be judged  by its
share  of the  output,  employment,  number  of units,  investment,  and  foreign
trade  in  each activity. Table  3  below  provides  a summary  .of  this  analysis
though  the  data  on investment  and  foreign  trade  are  partial  and  qualitative
for  the  most  part.  The  major  findings  of the  analysis  are  as follows:
(1) Trade,  agriculture,  manufacturing  and  transport  are  the  activities
in  which  the  private  sector  accounts  for  over  50 percent  of the
output. In terms  of the  private  sector  share  of employment  and
number  of  units,  these  four  activities  and  construction  dominate.
In general,  these  three  indicators  tend  to  move together. A major
exception  is construction  in  which  the  private  sector  accounts  for
99.8  percent  of the  number  of  units,  but produces  only  50  percent
5/ Health  and  education  are  subsectors  of "community,  social  and  personal
services"  (see  Table  l,  Row i).- 143
HAM'Ns PRIVATE  SECTORt  INDICATORS  Of  RELATIVE I)YORTANCE  I
Private  Private  Private  Sector  Private  Sector  Share  Private  Sector  Shre  Private  S  -tor
\ Secor  Sector  Share  Share  of  of  No.  of  Units  of  Investment  Share  of Exports
Seator\S  re  of  Output  (X)  Enploywont  (X)
Agriculture.  80.0  97.6  Crop,  livestock  poultry  Nearly  1OOX in  priv.sect.1  Significant
Ltvestock,  enterprises  - 962  pub.  invtstment  limited  to  (noarly  1OOX)  in
Forestry  nd  Forestry  - 95X  * few  plantations  and  ftve  cocoa:  substantial
ftshing  Fisheries  - 98X  timber  and  fishery  units.  Cn timber:  modest
in  fishing.
------------------------------------------- _---------------------__----------__--------------------------------------------------
Mining  and  25.0  12.4  Negllgible  in  Mining  Negltgible  Ln  mining:  1002  in  mining  by
Quarrying  (2  Joint  ventures)  substantial  in  quarrying.  the  state-owned
Quarrying  - ao0  and  Joint-venture
units.
---------------------------------------- _---------------__-----_-------------__---_----------------------------------------------
Manufacturlng  75.0  95.0  Large and  m*dlu  No  reliable  data  on  large  Crowing  share  of
sector  - 96X  scale sector:  wood  products,  furni-
Smll  scale  - lOO0  100l  in the  small scale  ture  and other  non-
sector  traditional  products.
UtilLties  1.0  5.3  One Joint  venture  in  gas:  Negligible:  almost  all  No export  by the
a fev  captive  diosel  utilittes  are  state owned,  private  sector.  but
generators  in  electricity:  the  state-owned
Rural  commnities snd NGOs  electricity
in  vater (102  of water  authority  exports
supply)  power to  neighboris:s
countries.
----------------------------------------------------- __--.-------------------__----------------------------------------------.
Construction  50.0  60.5  Constructon  enterprlses  and
contractors  - 99.51  Substantial  None
Trade (retail  95.0  97.0  Nearly  2001  of  the  trading  Probably  close  to  902  None
and  wholesale)  firms  registered  with  Chamber
of  Commerce - 91S
----------------------------------------------------------------------- __----__--------------------------------------------------
Transport  and  60.0  71.0  Nearly  1002  in  Road  SLgnLficant  In  road  None
Communications  Transport  transport:
Noan in  rvalway,  air and  NegiLSible  ln
water transport:  negLigible  coanicatLon
in  communications.
Finance.  20.0  25.0  Negligible  in  Bankingg  Negigible  except  In the  None
Insurance  and  8 out  of  10  insurance  rural  banks.
Related  Services  companies  private
Health  30.0  35.0  311  of  doctors  ia  private  Probably  below  a  tlird  None
practice:  452  of hospitals  of  the total Investment.
& clinLes  prtvate
Educatlon  5.0  7.0  382  of  senior  secondary  and  Relatively  minor in  the  None
742  of technLeal  schools  tn  overall  context.
private  sector.  Private
sector  share  neglIgible  in
other sectors.- 15 .
of the  output. This  paradox  is explained  by the  small  scale
operations  of the  vast  majority  of the  private  construction
contractors  and  the  dominance  of a few  large  scale  public  sector
construction  enterprises.
(2)  There  are  sectors  whose  overall  private  share  of  output  does  not
fully  reflect  the  private  sector  dominance  of its  segments
(subsectors).  Thus  in  mining  and  quarrying,  the  private  sector
share  is  only 25  percent,  but  quarrying  is  primarily  a  private
sector  activity  (with  80 percent  of the  units  in  the  private
sector). Nearly  100  percent  of the  road  transport  enterprises
(most  of them  small  scale)  are  privately  owned  and  operated,
though  the  private  output  share  of the  transport  and
communications  sector  is  only  60  percent.
(3) The  private  sector  share  of investmt3nt  is the  highest  in
agriculture. Public  investment  in  agriculture,  for  example,  is
limited  to  a few  plantations  and  timber  and  fishery  units.
Quantitative  estimates  of investments,  however,  are  hard  to come
by.  The  assessments  of  private  investment  fn^und  in  Table  3 are
based  on informed  judgment  and  partial  evidor.ce.
(4)  Similarly,  the  role  of foreign  trade  by private  sector  activity  is
difficult  to assess. As far  as exports  are  concerned,  the  private
sector  is  dominant  in  agriculture  (e.g.,  cocoa,  timber,  fishing).- 16 -
The  private  sector  export  share  in  non-traditional  industries  such
as  wood-based  products,  is  also  significant  though  the  total
volume  of export  is  modest.
(5)  The  role  of the  private  sector  is the  least  significant  in
utilities  (electricity,  gas  and  water),  education,  finance,  mining
and  health  (see  Table  4).  These  are  sectors  in  which  state
ownership  and  management  are  dominant  either  because  natural
monopolies  or  public  goods  are  involved  or because  the
technological  and  financial  resources  required  were  considered.
beyond  the  means  of the  indigenous  private  sector. Joint  ventures
with  foreign  partners,  however,  now  exist  in the  mining  and
finance  sectors.
The  performance,  contribution,  and  growth  of the  private  sector
will depend  not only  on its  relative  importance  in the  economy,  but also  on
the  organizational  features  of its  constituent  units  and  the  policy
environment  in  which  they  operate. To assess  these  dimensions,  the  ten
sectors  of activity  listed  in  Table  4  were  examined  in  terms  of the  size  of
their  operating  units,  their  forms  of organization,  and  the  degree  of
competition  and  entry  barriers  facing  them. The  results  are  summarized  in
Table  4.  Several  important  features  of the  private  sector  emerge  from  this
analysis.^  17  -
TABLE  4
CHA'S  PRIVATE  SECTOR: SIZE,  ORGANIZATION  &  COMPETITION
Indicator  Slto  of  Typos  of  Degree  of  Entry bCarters
Sector  Units  Organisation  CompetitLon
Agriculture,  fost are small,  fmtdly  Dominant  categories  are  Highly  competitive  tn  Freo  entry  for  harnsianss
Llvestock.  Forestry  farmslself-employed  self-employed  persona,  production:  monopoly  regulated  entry for
snd  Fishing  perso-ss  enterprises  sole  proprietorships,  in  the  marketing  of  foreign  investors.
are  mall  or mediumr  cooperatives,  and  crops like  cocoa.
asimd,  corporate  enterprises.
MnLng  and  Small  units  In  diamond  Cooperatives:  Sole  Highly  competitive  in  Regulated  entry  ln  mining:
Quarrying  mining  and  small  units  propriotorships:  self-  quarrying:  olisopo-  free  entry  in  quarrying.
in  quarrying,  mployed  persons.  listic  in  mining.
Manufacturlng  Majority  are  small  Solo  proprietorshipst  Highly  competitive  in  Nominally  free  entry  Ln
scale  units  (5  workers  Cooperatives:  the  amall  scale:  many  industties:  but
on  the  average):  tn  Limtted  labillity  limited  competition  regulatory  barrilers  limit
the  modern  sector,  600  companies.  in  some large  scale  entry  to  both small  scale
small  scale  units  and  industries:  import  and  large  scale  Lndustri*s
420  large  and medlum  competition  pervasive.
units.
-------------------------------------------------------------------- __-------__-----------------------------------------------
UtLlLties  Private  operations  Llmited  liability  Olig0poliLtic  or  Statutory  entry  barrers.
small in  siae:  sector  companies:  small  monopollstic  tendencies Large scale  financial  and
dominated  by large  cominity groups.  strong,  technology  requirements
scale  public  further  limlt  entry.
enterprises.
Construction  Majority  are small  Sole  proprietorships  Highly  competitive  in  Free  entry  for local
scale  units  a few  limited  Iabillity  the small  scale  sector: entrepreneurs:  regulated
large  scale  enterprises.  oligopolistic  in  the  entry for  foreign
contractors  (foreLin)  large  scale sector.  inveotors.
---------------------------------------------------------------- __-----------__---------------------.--------------------------
Trade (retail  and  Mostly  small  scale  Self-employed  persons:  Highly  compotitive.  Free  entry for local
wholesale)  units except  for trade  Sole  proprletorship:  entrepreneurs:  restricted
by manufacturLng  firms. Cooperatives:  LLmited  entry for  foreigners  based
ILabillty  companles.  on volum  of trade.
-__----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transport  and  Predominantly  small  Sole  proprietorship,  HLihly  competitive  In  Free entry  for  Chanalans
ComounLcatlons  scale  units In  road  limited  llabilLty  intra-city  transport:  In  road  transport:
transport:  private  companies:  self-employed  less  competitive  In  Regulated  entry In  other
sector's  role  negLi-  persons.  inter-city  transport.  sub-sectors.
giblo in  other  areas  None in  communications.
of transport  snd
communications.
Flnance.  Small scale  In rural  Joint  ventures:  limited  LLmited  competition  Regulated  entry  except
Insurance  and  banks:  large scale in  llbillty companies;  due to strong  state  in  the Informal  sector.
Related  Services  commerclal  & insurance  informal  money  lenders,  control.
sectors.
Health  Small scale  and  medium  Self-employed  doctors:  Moderately  competitIve  Restricted  entry through
scale  operatLons,  non-profit  or  church-  in  urban areas,  licensing:  Hlgh  costs  also
related  organizations.  limit  entry.
Education  Small and  medium  Sole  proprletorships  Moderately  competittve. Restricted  entrys  HIgh
scale  units,  cooporativess  non-profit  costs  also limit  entry.
type:  church  related.- 18 -
(1)  Small-scale  units  dominate  the  private  sector  in  agriculture,
trade,  manufacturing,  construction  and  road  transport. 6
Manufacturing  is the  only  sector  in  which  of the  1,016  registered
establishments,  about  40 percent  are  estimated  to  be large  and
medium-scale  units. In all  these  activities,  the  informal  sector
plays  a  major  role.  (See  Annex  II for  estimates  of self-employed
persons  in different  sectors).
(2) Self-employed  persons,  sole  proprietorships,  cooperatives  and
limited  liability  companies  are found  in  varying  combinations  in
the  foregoing  sectors. Limited  liability  companies  are  found  more
in  manufacturing,  trade,  construction  and  road  transport.
Cooperatives  are found  in  agriculture,  manufacturing,  mining  and
education. Sole  proprietorship  are  ubiquitous.
(3)  Given  the  prevalence  of small-scale  units,  it is  not  surprising
that  competition  is strong  in  all  the  sectors  in  which  the  private
sector  is dominant. The  major  exception  is  manufacturing  which
has several  product  groups  with a limited  number  of competing
firms  (e.g.,  cement,  evaporated  milk). On the  other  hand,  import
competition  has increased  in  recent  years,  threatening  the
6/  According  to the  recent  industrial  census,  a small-scale  unit is  one
which  employs  not  more  than  nine  workers. A medium  unit  may  employ
between  10 and  29  workers. Large-scale  units  employ  30  or more  workers.- 19  -
protected  markets  enjoyed  by the  oligopolists.  Whether  the
government's  procurement  policies  limit  competition  and  put  the
private  sector  at a disadvantage  is an issue  which  deserves
further  probing.
(4) The  prevalent  degree  of competition  in a sector  is largely  a
function  of the  entry  and  exit  barriers  that  face  enterprises.  In
all  activities  dominated  by the  private  sector,  there  is
relatively  free  entry  for  Ghanaian  entrepreneurs  except  in
manufacturing  where  all  entrepreneurs,  both  large  and  small,  do
face  regulatory  barriers  of  varying  severity. The  Investment  Code
of 1985  has a list  of 20 activities  to  which  entry  is  barred  to
foreigners  (see  Annex  III). Information  on  exit  barriers,
however,  is  less  readily  available. For  small-scale  units,  exit
is easy. However,  it is  reported  that  large-scale  units  need to
negotiate  the  conditions  for  exit  and that  some  of the  exit
conditions  (e.g.,  retrenchment  of labor)  can  be onerous.
(5) As noted  earlter,  systematic  performance  data  on the  private
sector  are  nonexistent  in  Ghana. The  only  available  data  on the
manufacturing  subsector  pertain  to  capacity  utilization  which  was
estimated  at 50  percent  in  1987. This is  an improvement  from  the
level  of 21  percent  in 1982. On the  other  hand,  private
investment  intentions  as reflected  in the  project  approvals  by the
Ghana  Investments  Centre  shows  a slight  decline  between  1986  and
1987.  Further  details  are  given  in  Annex  II.- 20
Emerging  Issues
The foregoing  brief  review  of the  private  sector  in  Ghana  shows
how difficult  it is to  assess  the  structure,  relative  importance  and
performance  of the  private  sector  solely  on the  basis  of published  data.
The  major  data  gaps  revealed  by this  review  and  which  will influence  the
scope  of the  present  assessment  exercise  are  as follows:
(1) The  basic  data  required  to  make  reliable  estimates  of the  output,
employment,  investment  and  productivity  of enterprises  even  in the
formal  sector  are  not available  in  Ghana. Data  on  performance
indicators  such  as  profitability,  costs,  and  measures  of growtb
and  productivity  are  non-existent.  Disaggregated  data  by
subsector  and  time  series  data  essential  for  the  analysis  of
trends  are  conspicuous  by their  absence. Sample  surveys  and
studies  of regions  or  selected  aspects  of the  private  sector  by
scholars  or government  agencies  also  do  not seem  to  exist.
(2) Much  less,  of course,  is  known  about  the  structure  of individual
industries  and  the  small  scale  and  informal  segments  of the
private  sector. Varying  definitions  of the  small  scale  and large
scale  enterprises  exist  which  render  careful  assessments  of
different  sub-sectors  difficult.
(3)  Government  is the  primary  source  of data  on the  p-:ivate  sector.
But  most government  data  tend  to lump  private  and  public  sector- 21 -
data  together. Private  sector's  own  associations  hardly  gather
any  systematic  data  pertaining  to the  sector's  operations,
performance  and  problems. There  is  no evidence  of any  analysis  of
the  private  sector's  recent  problems  (e.g.  the  factors  underlying
low  capacity  utilization,  credit  squeeze  and its  impact,  problems
with investment  approvals)  having  been  done  by such  associations
or other  academic  or research  groups.
(4)  Though  private  entrepreneurs  dominate  sectors  of the  economy  such
as agriculture,  manufacturing  industries,  transport,  trade  and
related  services,  and  construction,  in  relative  terms,  more
information  is  available  on the  industry  sector  than  on others.
Agriculture  and  trade,  for  example,  are  more important  sectors  in
terms  of their  GDP  contribution.  Yet the  information  available  on
their  structure  and  performance  is  more scanty  than  on industry
largely  because  of their  highly  informal  and  geographically
decentralized  nature.
In light  of the  findings  of the  general  analysis  of the  private
sector  as reported  above,  it  was  decided  to limit  the  scope  of the  PSA
exercise  to the  industry  sector. Here  the  basic  information  was  relatively
better  organizad  and  the  potential  for  PSD  seemed  brighter  in this  sector
in  view of the  actions  already  taken  by GOG  and  the  Bank  through  the
Economic  Recovery  Program. For  purposes  of the  pilot  exercise,  however,
the  mining  sub-sector  was  excluded  as it  was  dominated  by the  public
sector. In effect,  therefore,  the  detailed  assessment  reported  below
focuses  on the  private  manufacturing  sector.- 22 -
Ill, The  Private  Industry  Sector: Policies.  Laws  and  Regulations
There  is  prima  facie  evidence  to show  that important  steps  have
been taken  by GOG  since  1983  to reform  its  policies  and  laws  so as to
improve  the  private  sector  environment  and  stimulate  private  investment  in
Ghana. Furthermore,  GOG  through  its  new industrial  policy,  has ar,ticulated
the  role it  envisages  for  the  private  sector. Several  concrete  steps  have
also  been taken  to  restore  general  investor  confidence  and to  encourage
private  sector-government  dialogue  on important  issues.
1.  Measures  to Imorove  the  Business  Environment
The  wide spectrum  of policy  reforms  summarized  below  can  be
regarded  as a major  contribution  to the  improvement  of the  business
environment  in  Ghana.
*  The  adoption  of a flexible  exchange  rate  policy  and  the
introduction  of foreign  exchange  auctions  have  eliminated  major
distortions  in  the  market  and  minimized  the  need for  cumbersome
administrative  controls. More than  50 percent  of the  foreign
exchange  at the  auctions  have gone  to  manufacturing  enterprises.
Trade  and  exchange  rate  reforms  have thus  improved  the  environment
for  efficient  business  planning  ar4  management  and increased  the
autonomy  of the  private  sector  to some  extent.- 23  -
*  The tariff  and  tax  reforms  introduced  in  recent  years  have  created
a structure  of  protection  more  conducive  to  the  development  of
efficient  import  substitution  and  export  promotion. The
restructuring  of import  duties,  sales  taxes  and  excise  taxes  has
led  to the  unification  of sales  tax  rates  across  most local  and
imported  goods,  reduction  in import  duty  rates  and  the
rationalization  of sales  tax  rates. GOG  has  also  reduced  the
company  tax  rates  for  certain  activities  and the  marginal  rates
for  personal  income  tax. The  tax  on dividends  is  proposed  to  be
reduced  to ten  percent  across  the  board.  Taxation  of  capital
gains  may  be so modified  that  only the  real  portion  of the  gains
will  be taxed. Capital  gains  arising  from  the  sale  of company
shares  are  also  likely  be exempted. These  policy  reforms  are
expected  to  have  a positive  impact  on the  incentives  of  private
entrepreneurs,  investors  and  managers.
*  Through  the  revision  of the  Investment  Code (1985),  GOG  has
demonstrated  its  determination  to  encourage  increased
participation  by  both  indigenous  and  foreign  investors  in  Ghana's
economic  recovery. The  Code  has  declared  a wide spectrum  of
activities  in  agriculture,  industry,  tourism  and  real  estate
development  as  priority  areas  for  private  investment,  and  has
provided  guarantees  against  expropriation,  and  for  the
repatriation  of foreign  capital  and  dividends. Provisions  exist
in the  Code  for.arbitration  in  case  of investment  disputes.- 24 -
Fiscal  incentives  for  priority  industries  include  exemption  from
import  duties,  substantial  investment  and  depreciation  allowances,
rebates  for  the  use  of local  labor  and  foreign  exchange  retention
accounts  against  export  earnings. The  Ghana  Investments  Centre
(GIC)  has  been  designated  as the  agency  to approve  investments
under  the  Code. The  revision  of the  Investment  Code  and the
Tariff  and  Trade  Reforms  have  in effect  reduced  entry  barriers
significantly  for  potential  private  investors. Needless  to say,
administrative  discretion  plays  a decisive  role  in the
interpretation  and  implementation  of the  Code. The influence  of
political  interference,  corruptior.  and  favoritism  cannot  be ruled
out in these  matters.
GOG  has taken  steps  to  reduce  the  coverage  of price  and
distribution  controls  on commodities.  The  number  of goods  under
price  control  are  currently  limited  to eight  and the  controls  are
administered  more flexibly  and  approvals  granted  more speadily.
GOG  has  also  removed  distribution  controls  on the  items  whose
prices  have  been  decontrolled.  As supply  conditions  improve,  the
remaining  price  controls  are  to  be phased  out.  The incentives  for
private  investment  specified  in the  Code  have thus  been further
reinforced  by these  decontrol  measures.
On the  labor  front,  a more  cooperative  relationship  is  being
encouraged  between  workers  and  management  through  the  activation
of the  Tripartite  Committee  (with  representation  from  workers,- 25  -
management  and  government)  to advise  on wages,  salaries  and  labor
relations. Private  entrepreneurs  report  that  the  mechanism  works,
though  delays  are  unavoidable.  While  unions  continue  to  be
strong,  it is  also  reported  that  a more  flexible  approach  to
retrenchment  in  enterprises  is  being  encouraged  by GOG  compared  to
its  position  in  1982.  Exit  barriers  have thus  been softened
somewhat  although  the  cost  of retrenchment  of  workers  to the
companies  has  been set  at an  unreasonably  high level  (seven  times
a  worker's  annual  emoluments  in  some  cases,  according  to  private
sector  sources). Despite  this  positive  directional  change  in
respect  of labor  policy,  labor  laws,  the  role  of trade  unions  and
the  current  hiring  and  firing  practices  deserve  a careful  look  as
labor  mobility  and  productivity  are  important  issaes  for  the
private  sector.
*  Industrial  finance  and  credit  policies  represent  an  area in  which
the  formal  private  sector  continues  to face  serious  difficulties.
In  part,  this  reflects  the  short-term  conflict  between  the  goals
of stabilization  and  structural  adjustment. Since  1987,  GOG  has
liberalized  all interest  rates  and  removed  all  sectoral  credit
ceilings  except  for  agriculture. It is  reported  that  the  banks
still  tend  to lend  short  term,  chiefly  to their  established
clients  in the  trade  sector. The  flow  of financial  resources  to
private  investment  seems  to have  been  hampered  in the  process. At
present,  excess  liquidity  in the  banking  system  coexists  with  a- 26 -
shortage  of liquidity  in  parts  of the  manufacturing  sector. The
latter's  demand  for  credit  has risen  sharply  due  to rising  import
costs  after  devaluation  and  the  100  percent  deposit  requirements
for  participation  in the  exchange  auctions. The failure  of the
banking  system  to intermediate  between  the  resource  rich  cocoa  and
mining  sectors  and  the  credit-starved  manufacturing  sector  has led
to a severe  financial  squeeze  on the  latter. This is a  problem
that  goes  beyond  policy  and  signals  the  need to devise  new
institutional  mechanisms  in the  financial  sector  to cope  with the
crisis.
2.  GOG  Statement  on Industrial  Policy
GOG's  industrial  policy  statement  of 1985  is  significant  in  that
it articulates  the  objectives  and  strategy  of the  country's  industrial
development  with special  reference  to the  future  role  of the  private  and
public  sectors  of the  economy. It  argues  for  a more limited  direct  public
sector  participation  in industry  aimed  at  making  the  most  effective  use  of
scarce  public,  financial  and  managerial  resources. The  overall  strategy,
according  to the  new  policy,  will  be to  limit  the  direct  participation  of
the  state  in industry  to  critical  areas  in  which  there  is  a gap in  the
availability  of  private  investment  or some  other  special  reason  for  direct
public  intervention.  There  is  a clear  recognition  in the  statement  that
industrialization  -equires  an active  partnership  between  the  private  and
public  sectors. It  also  declares  that  GOG  will continue  to take  steps  to
enhance  the  business  climate  through  consultation,  improved  worker-
management  relations,  and  encouragement  of positive  worker  attitudes  toward
improved  productivity.-27-
3.  Policies  to  Build  Investor  Confidence
Apart  from  the  revision  of the  Investment  Code  and  the  industrial
policy  statement,  three  other  actions  taken  in the  recent  past  must  be
. a
noted  as relevant  to the  creation  of  private  sector  confidence  in  Ghana.
(a)  One  of the  negative  factors  that  has  hurt  Ghana's  business
environment  is  GOG's  past  expropriation  of foreign  assets  and its
failure  to  repatriate  the  foreign  capital  involved. GOG  has  now
begun  to  repatriate  the  blocked  capital  and  dividend  arrears  due
to foreign  private  investors.  Payments  are  being  made on a
"first-in,  first-out"  basis. 7 The  total  amount  to  be repatriated
is estimated  at $43  million. There  has,  however,  been  no declared
policy  on this  subject. While  a  major  criticism  of  Ghana's
investment  climate  will  thus  lose  its  force  as a result  of the
ongoing  repatriation,  much  more  positive  impact  could  have  been
gained  from  this  action  if the  policy  was  made  known
internationally.  The  IFC  mission  which  examined  this  issue
suspects  that  all  blocked  funds  have  not  perhaps  been included
within  the  current  program  of repatriation.
(b)  Public  confidence  in the  banking  system  was shaken  in the  early
1980s  by measures  such  as the  demonetization  of 50  cedi  notes,  the
7/  As  confirmed  by  the  Bank  of  Ghana  in  a  personal  interview  of  the  author
with  the  Deputy  Governor.- 28  -
S  -
freezing  of  bank  deposit  accounts'in  excess  of 50,000  cedis,  and
the  requirement  of the  compulsory  payment  by checks  for  all
business  transactions  in  excess  of 1,000  cedis. In order  to
restore  public  confidence,  GOG  has recently  announced  that  it
would  compensate  those  affected  by the  demonetization  of the  50
cedi  notes. This,  however,  is  no guarantee  that  undue
governmental  interference  in financial  transactions  will  not  occur
in the  future.
(c)  In order  to increase  public  confidence  in the  banking  system,  GOG
is considering  the  repeal  of the  Banking  and  Financial
Institutions  Decree  in  order  to ensure  that  all  disclosures  of
information  from  banks  are  consistent  with the  Banking  Act of
1970.  GOG  also  intends  to  amend  the  Banking  Act  of 1970  to
incorporate  new  provisions  requiring  secrecy  in respect  of
customers'  accounts  by the  Banks'  directors,  officers,  staff  and
auditors. In order  to instill  public  confidence  in  banks,  a
public  education  campaign  on the  new  laws is  also  proposed  to  be
mounted.
4.  Informal  Regulators  Barriers
While  the  positive  developments  on the  industrial  policy  and
regulatory  front  are  encouraging,  a number  of important  regulatory
constraints  still  remain. It is  useful  to distinguish  between  formal  and
informal  regulatory  barriers  in  this  context.  The  formal  barriers  are
relatively  easy  to  identify  as  the  underlying  laws,  regulations  and29  -
procedures  are  g'nerally  publicized  or are  accessible  to the  public. This
category  of barriers  is  discussed  below  in  the  context  of the  relevant
public  regulatory  agencies.  The  informal  regulatory  barriers,  on  the  other
hand,  are  less  visible  and  their  legitimacy  cannot  be  easily  probed  or
determined  by  outside  observers.  The  fact,  however,  is  that  such  barriers
do exist  in  Ghana  and  that  they  are  a constraint  on private  sector
development. Some  examples  are  given  below  both to  underline  their
significance  and  to  highlight  the  need to explore  them  in.greater  depth.
(1)  While  the  Investment  Code  offers  a reasonably  fair  treatment  to
foreign  investors  and  clarifies  what the  latter  can  expect  in
terms  of incentives  and  benefits,  it is  reported  that  there  is an
informal  procedure  whereby  individual  foreign  investors  are
cleared  or approved  for  entry  prior  to the  application  to the
provisions  of the  Code. This  is  probably  part  of the  political
process  and is  completed  well  before  the  formal  regulatory  process
takes  over. The fact  remains,  however,  that  it is  an invisible,
but  effective  entry  barrier  as far  as foreign  investors  are
concerned.
(2)  Potential  investors  (foreign  and  domestic)  are  required  to  go
through  the  Ministry  of  Labor  for  the  recruitment  of labor
(skilled  and  unskilled). It is  not  clear  as to  whether  this
restriction  stems  from  a formal  legal  requirement  or is a  carry
over  from  an old  convention. It is  claimed  by some  observers  that
well connected  investors  circumvent  this  barrier  effectively.  But
for  potential  foreign  investors,  this  will  be a deterrent  as it
adds  to their  uncertainty  and  limits  their  managerial  autonomy.- 30  -
(3) While  according  to law,  enterprises  can  be closed  and  workers
retrenched,  in effect,  retrenchments  are  conditional  on the
approval  of  powerful  political  groups  such  as the  Committee  for
the  Defence  of the  Revolution. The  terms  of retrenchment  are
negotiated  by the  management  with the  latter  though  there  is
nothing  in the  law  that  requires  it.  Exit  barriers  for  private
firms  are  raised  in the  process  since  the  negotiations  typically
lead  to fairly  costly  settlements.  It is interesting  that  this
pattern  coexists  with  GOG's  declared  policy  to liquidate  several
state-owned  enterprises  and  retrench  their  workers. The  operation
of the  labor  market  thus  seems  to  be hamstrung  by a  multiplicity
of  formal  and  informal  regulatory  barriers.
(4)  In  the  fields  of  banking  and  taxation  also,  informal  regulatory
barriers  are  reported  to  be at  work.  A careful  assessment  of
these  barriers  is in  order  as the  normal  tendency  is  to focus  on
the  explicit  and  formal  constraints  and to ignore  the  less  visible
and  informal  ones.
Furthermore,  in  spite  of  GOG's  explicit  policy  to encourage
consultation,  government-private  sector  dialogue  remains  a  weak spot  in
Ghana. This  probably  is  one  of the  barriers  to the  restoration  of private
sector  confidence  in  GOG's  policies  and  institutions.  Most of the  private
sector  representatives  interviewed  were of the  view that  much  more remained
to  be done  in this  area  and that  actions  like  the  appointment  of a few- 31  -
private  sector  members  on the  National  Economic  Commission  were  more
symbolic  than  real  in terms  of their  significance  and impact. More
effective  ways to deal  with informal  regulatory  constraints,  for  example,
could  have  been developed  through  feedback  from  consultations  with the
private  sector.
IV.  Public  Institutions:  Constraints  on  Policy  Implementation
The  policies,  laws  and  regulations  discussed  in the  preceding
section  are  being implemented  in  Shana  through  the  ministries  and  other
agencies  of GOG.  In some  cases,  recent  policy  reforms  have  resulted  in a
diminished  role for  the  relevant  public  institutions  as far  as
implementation  is  concerned. In  other  cases,  policy  reforms  may  not  have
reduced  the  responsibilities  of the  public  institutions,  but  have  caused
them  to streamline  their  operations.  As part  of the  PSA  exercise,  an
attempt  has  been  made to evaluate  the  extent  to  which  constraints  continue
to  be imposed  on the  private  sector  by the  public  institutions  which
formulate  and implement  important  pol'.cios  and  laws  or provide  support
services.
Key  Institutions
The  public  institutions  which  have  a direct  impact  on PSD in  Ghana
fall  into  three  categories: (1)  ministries  and  other  public  agencies
primarily  engaged  in  policy  making  and implementation  which  affect  the
private  sector;  (2)  financial  institutions  (almost  all  of them  wholly  or- 32 -
partly  state  owned)  which  provide  credit  (term  loans  and  working  capital)
to the  private  sector;  and (3)  specialized  public  agencies  which  offer
support  services  and  advice  to the  private  sector. A partial  list  of the
public  institutions  in three  categories  is  given  below:
1.  Policymaking  and  Regulatory  Agencies
*  Ministry  of Industries,  Science  and  Technology
*  Ministry  of  Trade
*  Ministry  of the  Interior
*  Other  Sector  Ministries  (e.g.,  Agriculture,  Transport)
*  The  Bank  of Ghana
*  The  National  Revenue  Ser-ice
*  The  Ghana  Investments  Centre
*  The  Registrar  General  of  Chana
*  Tripartite  Committees  on  Wages  and  Salaries
*  The Prices  and Incomes  Board
2.  Financial  Institutions
*  Ghana  Commercial  Bank
*  Barclays  Bank
*  Standard  Bank
*  Soc'sl  Security  Bank
*  Bank  for  Housing  and  Construction- 33 -
*  National  Investment  Bank
*  National  Savings  and  Credit  Bank
*  Agriculture  Development  Bank
*  Cooperative  Bank
*  Merchant  Bank
*  Insurance  Companies  (4)
*  Consolidated  Discount  House
3.  S,pecialized  Service  Institutions
*  - Ghana  Standards  Board
*  Export  Promotion  Council
*  National  Board  for  Small  Scale  Industries
*  Council  for  Scientific  and  Industrial  Research
*  Management  Development  and  Productivity  Institute
*  aUniversities
Institutional  ImDlications  of Policy  Reforms
Recent  policy  reforms  have redefined  the  roles  of the  policymaking
and  regulatory  institutions  described  above. Viewed  from  the  standpoint  of
the  constraints  they  impose  on the  private  sector,  these  public
institutions  vary  a great  deal. New investors  who  wish to  benefit  from  the
incentives  offered  by the  Investment  Code  must  get  their  proposals  approved
by the  GIC.  If the  GIC functions  according  to design,  the  dependence  of- 34  -
investors  on sector  ministries  for  getting  clearances  should  decline. All
entrepreneurs,  foreign  and  local,  must  deal  with the  National  Revenue
Service  on taxation  and  import  matters. Enterprises  which  have  an
immigrant  quota  must get  their  clearances  from  the  Ministry  of the
Interior. Policy  reforms  will  not  produce  the  expected  results  unless  the
implementing  institutions  are  suitably  restructured  and  enabled  to  play
their  changed  roles  effectively. In  Ghana's  case,  the  severity  of the
constraints  associated  with  some  of these  agencies  has declined,  whereas  in
other  agencies,  improvements  are  not  yet in  sight. Several  examples  of the
progress  of institutional  reform  relevant  to  PSD  are  given  below.  Special
attention  is given  to the  GIC in  view of the  importance  of promoting
private  investment.
(1)  As mentioned,  some  of the  policy  reforms  have  had the  impact  of
reducing  the  administrative  control  and  discretion  exercised  by certain  key
agencies  of COG.  For  example,  exchange  rate  and  foreign  exchange
allocation  reforms  have led  to the  replacement  of specific  import  licensing
involving  firm level  allocation  by sector  ministries  through  the  automatic
issue  of "A-licenses  by the  Ministry  of Trade. Special  import  licenses  are
readily  issued  to importers  who  require  official  foreign  exchange.
Conservative  demand  management,  as well  as the  introduction  of the  foreign
exchange  auction,  has narrowed  the  gap  between  the  parallel  and  official
exchange  rates. The  liberal  import  policy  of  COG  has  considerably  eased
the  dependence  of the  private  sector  on sector  ministries  and  BOG  for
approvals  and  thus  reduced  the  severity  of  a much  maligned  constraint. In
order  to encourage  the  flow  of additional  resources  through  legal  channels- 35  -
and  to improve  the  operation  of the  exchange  system,  particularly  the
process  of obtaining  small  amounts  of currency  on a  daily  basis,  the
Government  permitted  the  establishment  of foreign  exchange  bureaus  in
February  1988 These  are  licensed  by the  Bank  of Ghana  and  are  subject  to
certain  rules  and  regulations.  Foreign  exchange  arising  from  retention
accounts  (except  cocoa  and  miring),  interest  earnings,  commissions  and
remittances,  and  that  held  by the  public  may  be sold  to the  bureaus.
Similarly,  the  reduction  in the  scope  of  pr4ce and  distribution  controls
has  weakened  another  constraint  on the  private  sector  imposed  by the  Prices
and  Incomes  Board. These  are  examples  of  how deregulation  has  been  used  to
minimize  the  constraints  of  public  institutions  on the  private  sector,
There  is,  of course,  scope  for  further  reform  in  this  area  as formal  and
informal  price  controls  on several  commodities  still  remain. For  example,
manufacturers  of some  mass  consumption  goods  such  as clothing,  beer,
cigarettes,  etc.  are  periodically  asked  by GOG  to meet  and  informally  agree
on a schedule  of prices  often  in light  of a review  of costs. A case  exists
for  the  continuing  review  and  elimination  of these  controls  as the  economic
situation  improves.
(2)  Ghana's  tariff  structure  has  been rationalized  to  provide  for  a
relatively  uniform  and  moderate  level  of protection,  with  duty  rates
ranging  between  0 and  25  percent. Special  import  taxes  had raised  nominal
protection  to 25-90  percent. In  order  to determine  the  distortions  caused
by the  incidence  of other  taxes  on  domestic  production  and  imports,  the
Government  reviewed  trade taxes  and  tariffs  in  1987. On the  basis  of this
review,  GOG  has  unified  the  sales  tax  on imports  to the  duty-inclusive- 36  -
value,  and  simplified  the  tariff  structure  to four  rates--exempt,  10
percent  (concessionary),  25  percent  (standard),  and  35  percent  (luxury).
In addition,  the  nominal  tariff  rate  was reduced  by a  uniform  5  percentage
points  for  the  bulk of goods  bearing  a customs  duty  of 15  percent  or
higher. In order  to  provide  temporary  protection  to selected  industries,  a
10  percent  special  tax  was levied  on some  import  categories  including:
selected  drugs,  garments,  cosmetics,  mineral  waters,  juice,  rubber  sandals,
soaps,  and  some  food  products. The excise  tax  was  extended  to  imports  and
the  specific  rate  of special  tax  on imports  of excisable  products  was
replaced  with a lower  rate  of 40  percent  ad  valorem. A similar  rate  of
special  tax  was imposed  on  textile  imports. The  net impact  of these
changes  was generally  to leave  nominal  rates  of  protection  unchanged  for
most products.
(3)  Tax reform  did  not  materially  divest  NRS  of its  administrative
functions. The  private  sector  has  to interact  with  NRS as in the  pre-
reform  days.  But  NRS  has endeavored  to improve  its  institutional  capacity
and services  to the  public. It  has gone  through  an internal  restructuring
and  an active  recruitment  phase  aided  by the  creation  of a separate
remuneration  structure. It  has initiated  a review  of its  administrative
tasks,  tax  laws  and  procedures  in line  with the  new  tax  policies. Though
NRS continues  to  be a  powerful  regulatory  and  enforcement  institution  as
far  as the  private  sector  is  concerned,  there  is  evidence  to show  that
steps  have  been taken  to  minimize  its  negative  image  and  to improve  its
services. Among  the  actions  taken  are  the  following:- 37 -
o  Bringing  the  National  Revenue  Secretariat  (NRS)  under  a PNDC
secretary  (minister)  to  coordinate  improvements  in  revenue
generation  and  effect  a restructuring  of the  Internal  Revenue
Service  (IRS)  and  the  Customs,  Excise  and  Preventive  Service
(CEPS);
9  Implementing  an  active  recruitment  program,  facilitated  by the
creation  of a separate  remuneration  structure,  to  upgrade  the
number  and  quality  of personnel  in  the  services;
o  Initiating  a review  of administration  in  the  two  services  and  a
review  of  tax  laws  to  bring  them  into  line  with changes  in the  tax
structure;
o  Increasing  the  logistical  support  available  to  the  revenue
institutions.
Among  other  measures  which  GOG  may adopt  to  strengthen  tax
administration  to  encourage  compliance  and improve  the  capacity  for
effective  policy  implementation  are:
o  Strengthening  the  operational  planning  and  management  functions  in
IRS  and  CEPS,  preparing  long  term  institutional  development  plans
and  annual  work  programs  to facilitate  decisions  about  the
appropriate  allocation  of resources,  and identify  training  needs;- 38 -
o  Training,  both of  new and  existing  staff,  and  at managerial  and
technical  levels;
o  Continuing  the  process  of functionalizing  the  organizational
structures  of the  IRS  and  the  CEPS;
o  Implementing  effective  programs  fur  enforcement  of filing  of
returns  and  payment  of arrears;
(4)  The  Ghana  Investments  Centre  (GIC)  is  also  an important  regulatory
and  promotional  agency  for  the  private  sector. Unlike  NRS,  however,  GIC
has not  yet  articulated  a strategy  for  institutional  improvement.  Under
Ghana's  Investment  Code (1985),  the  GIC  is entrusted  with the
responsibility  for  promoting,  approving  and  overseeing  the  implementation
of all  new investments  (indigenous  and foreign)  in  Ghana,  excluding  those
in  the  mining  and-petrolieum  sectors. Its  mandate  is to  be a "one  stop
shop"  for  investment  approval. The  GIC  today  has  a total  staff  of 147  of
whom 36  are  professionals.  Implementation  of the  organizational  structure
as  proposed  by an earlier  IFC  mission  is  under  way, though  all  departments
are  not  yet fully  staffed. GIC's  progress  in following  up on the  IFC
recommendations  in other  areas  has  been  slower.
First  of all,  the  streamlining  of GIC  procedures  for  approval  has
made  only  limited  progress. The sector  ministry  clearance  f-r  new
investments  is  now  obtained  before  GIC approval  occurs. In order  to reduce
processing  delays,  the  GIC  has introduced  a two-stage  approval  system- 39  -
whereby  an investor  can  get  an initial  clearance  in two  weeks  to  enable  him
to  start  his  work with  other  agencies  such  as  banks,  NRS, etc. The second
stage  will then  be devoted  to a detailed  review  of the  investment  approval.
On the  other  hand,  clearances  or approvals  by the  Bank  of  Ghana,
Immigration,  Customs,  NRS,  Lands,  Labor,  etc.,  are  left  to the  investor  to
obtain  after  GIC approval  takes  place. There  is inertia  in the  system  and
GIC  ptaff  resources  seem  to  be too inadequate  to  speed  up the  process  or
work out  better  coordination-mechanisms.  Second,  some  duplication  of
efforts  by other  departments  in  performing  functions  assigned  to  GIC  under
the  code  continues. In  some  cases  like  the  Fisheries  Department,  the
conflict  arises  from  the  existence  of  prior  legislation  which  they  continue
to implement.  The resolution  of these  conflicts  through  subsidiary
legislation  and  appropriate  regulations  is  yet  to take  place. The  net
result  is that  the  GIC is  unable  to act  as a one  stop  shop  for  potential
investors.  The  GIC feels  that  amendments  to  the  code  should  be taken  up
only  after  a reasonable  trial  period. Third,  the  GIC  has  not  yet taken  up
the  task  of  preparing  an indicative  priorities  schedule  for  investment
which  will  also  be in  harmony  with the  priorities  of the  Bank  of Ghana.
The lack  of progress  on the  part  of the  GIC in following  up on the
IFC  recommendations  reflects  its  limited  staff  resources  and infrastructure
facilities  coupled  with the  relative  inexperience  of  many  of the
professional  staff. As the  number  and  complexity  of investment  proposals
increase,  staff  will  be preoccupied  with  regulatory  and  approval  functions
at the  cost  of their  promotional  and  advisory  functions. The  broader
managerial functions  of streamlining  procedures,  improving  coordination,40 -
evolving  promotional  strategies  and  support  services  are  left  to the  Chief
Executive  who does  not  have any  expert  staff  to provide  advice  or
assistance  to  accomplish  these  tasks  at  present. Above  all, there  is  the
continuing  problem  that  the  GIC  faces  in attracting  and  retaining  high
quality  staff  in  view  of the  low  civil  service  salaries  and incentives.  In
this  regard,  the  GIC is clearly  behind  NRS.
As part of the  PSA  exercise,  a proposal  for  technical  assistance
to the  GIC  was  prepared  and  the  GOG  and  the  Bank  agreed  thr.t  the  proposed
assistance  should  be provided  through  the  Industrial  Sector  Adjustment
Credit. Simultaneously,  the  IFC  had  arranged  for  additional  assistance
from  the  Irish  Development  Authority  to  the  GIC  to initiate  its  promotional
activities. Buit  no formal  action  has  been  taken  by the  GIC sc far  which  in
turn  is a reflection  of its  limited  institutional  capacity. The  delay  may
have  been caused  also  by the  recent  change  in the  top  leadership  of the
GIC.
(5)  Reforms  in  monetary  and  credit  policies  should  normally  have  been
followed  by a  vigorous  and  competitive  response  by the  banks  to serve  the
private  sector. But  the  banks  in  Ghana  have in recent  years  experienced  a
steady  decline  in  performance  and  institutional  resilience.  They  have
large  non-performing  loan  portfolios,  high  operational  costs,  capital
inadequacy  and  poor  accounting  systems,  management  information  and
:ontrols. They find  it  difficult  to improve  efficiency  because  of the
antiquated  systems  and  procedures  in  vogue  and  a severe  shortage  of
qualified  and  trained  staff. Central  Bank  regulations  are such  that- 41
competition  among  the  banks  is  discouraged  and  incentives  to improve
efficiency  are  reduced. A comprehensive  diagnosis  of these  ills  is
currently  under  way and  measures  to  reform  and  restructure  the  financial
sector  have  been  proposed  under  the  recently  approved  financial  sector
adjustment  credit  of the  World  Bank. Meanwhile  the  credit  squeeze
resulting  from  the  tight  credit  policy  of BOG  and the  institutional
weaknesses  of the  banking  system  will  continue  to  be a critical  constraint
on the  operation  of the  private  sector. The line  of credit  available  to
local  entrepreneurs  through  che  Industrial  Sector  Adjustment  Credit  (ISEC)
remains  largely  unutilized. Small  scale  enterprises  have  been enable  to
take  delivery  of the  imported  machine  tools  ordered  by them  through  a
bilateral  credit  arrangement.  In  both cases,  entrepreneurs  have  been
unable  to arrange  local  currency  resources  to finance  their  investments.
It is  reported,  however,  that  the  informal  sector  has  no shortage  of credit
for  which  it  pays  higher  interest  r -s than  those  of the  banking  system.
The formal  manufacturing  sector  appears  to  be the  hardest  hit  by the
current  credit  squeeze. It does  not,  however,  seem  to tap  the  informal
sector  for  credit.
An important  gap  in the  financial  sector  is  the  relatively
undeveloped  state  of the  advisory  support  and  services  banks  provide  to
their  clients. Information  services,  studies  of market  and investment
opportunities,  advisory  services  for  small  enterprises,  etc.,  are  seldom
offered  by most  banks  to  their  clients. By and  large,  the  banks  stay  with
their  established  customers  who are  not  often  in need  of such  services.- 42 -
(6)  The support  service  institutions  in the  third  category,  on the
whole,  lack  the  basic  capacity,  manpower  and  facilities  required  to  perform
:,
their  functions. An excepition  is the  Export  Promotx,n  Council  which  is
perhaps  the  best organized  among  this  set  of institutions.  In this  pilot
PSA  exercise,  it  has  not  been  possible  to examine  each  of these
institutions  in depth. A few  examples,  however,  will  highlight  the  basic
problem. The  National  Board  for  Small  Scale  Industries  (NBSSI)  which  is
meant  to  promote  and  service  small  scale  enterprises  has a small  office  in
Accra  with four  professional  staff. It  has  no regional  presence  whatsoever
though  small  scale  enterprises  are  scattered  throughout  the  country  and
cannot  possibly  go to the  capital  for  assistance  and  information.  NBSSI's
resources  are  limited  and  its  knowledge  of the  sector  it is  supposed  to
serve  is scanty. The  MDPI,  the  lead  management  training  institution,  has
inadequate  physical  facilities,  library  and  teaching  materials  and faculty.
It  has  been  unable  to  move to its  new  campus  because  of the  lack  of funds
to complete  its  half finished  buildings. MDPI again  has  no regional
centers. A modest  program  of support  has  been  proposed  for  NBSSI  and  MDPI
in the  Bank's  Small  and  Medium  Enterprise  Development  (SME)  Project  which
is  under  preparation. It is doubtful  that  such  limited  assistance  for
short  periods  will,  lead  to sustainable  institutional  development.  The
problem  is that  the  core  support  and long  term  actions  required  for  their
survival  and  growth  have  not received  the  attention  they  receive  from  any
quarter. This,  more than  anything  else,  will  be the  key  barrier  to  the
development  of such  public  institutions  which  admittedly  have  major  role  to
play in support  of PSD.- 43 -
Infrastructure  and  Public  Institutions
There  are  several  public  institutions  in  Ghana  which  are
responsible  for  the  provision  of infrastructural  facilities  and  services.
Such  institutions  and  the  policies  governing  them  have  not  been examined  in
this  exercise  chiefly  because  infrastructure  was  not identified  as a  major
constraint  for  the  industrial  sector  by most of the  entrepreneurs
interviewed. 8 This is  not to  say  that  infrastructure  is  satisfactory  in
all  respects,  but to emphasize  that  other  more severe  constraints  exist. A
brief  assessment  of the  infrastructure  relevant  to PSD  is given  below.
Ghana's  energy  resources,  which  consist  chiefly  of  hydropower  and
fuelwood,  are  quite  substantial. Its  total  installed  public  generating
capacity  is  about  1,122  MW.  Of this  capacity,  95 percent  is  hydroelectric.
Ghana  is an important  exporter  of electricity  through  its  sales  to
neighboring  nountries. No capacity  constraint  is  envisaged  for  the  next
decade. It is expected  that  thermal  capacity  will  be needed  in  the  1990s
to complement  hydro  generation  as the  domestic  load  grows. The
8/ This,  of course,  can  be misleading  especially  when investment  is
stagnant  or severe  underutilization  of capacity  exists. Educated
manpower  may  seem  adequate  to  entrepreneurs.  Yet an  expansion  of
private  investment  may  bring  to light  shortages  of technical  and
managerial  manpower. Education  is  one  aspect  of infrastructure  which
could  not  be assessed  in this  exercise.-44-
rehabilitation  of the  distribution  sys..vu  remains  an  unfinished  task,  but
is  being  tackled  through  a series  of projects  which  also  provide  technical
assistance  to the  power  authority.
The 1970s  witnessed  a steady  deterioration  in transport,
communications  and  other  infrastructure  essential  for  PSD. There  has,
however,  been a significant  improvement  on the transport  front  by 1987
mainly  as a result  of the  high  priority  attached  to infrastructure  by the
Economic  Recovery  Program  (ERP)  which  began  in  1984. Under  the  1984-86
ERP,  nearly  50  percent  of the  available  foreign  exchange  resources  were
allocated  t-  physical  infrastructure,  mainly  transport.
The  1986-88  program  has also  given  a similarly  high allocation  to
infrastructure.  As a result,  the  rehabilitation  of roads,  railways,  ports,
lake  transport  and  air  transport  has  made  considerable  progress  with the
assistance  of the  Bank  and  other  donors,  though  continued  high  priority
needs  to  be given  to  catch  up with  rehabilitation  needs  particularly  in  the
roads  sector. The  improved  railway  and  port facilities  under  ongoing  port
and  railway  rehabilitation  projects  would  generally  provide  facilities
adequate  for  the  next  decade  or so.  In the  case  of roads,  however,  only
about  30  percent  of the  network  is in  good  condition;  roads  in the  Northern
Region  and those  serving  agricultural  areas  need  further  rehabilitation  and
expansion. Agro-based  industries  and  other  new  ventures  in  rural  areas
will,  therefore,  continue  to face  transport  bottlenecks.  Air transport
capacity  appears  to  be adequate  except  for  the  facilities  for  handling  air
cargo  at  Accra.-45-
Unlike  transpoit,  the  communications  subsector  has experienced  a
decline  in its  services  and facilities  in the  1980s. Congestion  and
frequent  breakdowns  in the  network,  inadequate  international  facilities  for
switching  and  transmission,  lack  of spares,  and  severe  skilled  manpower
shortages  are  among  the  major  reasons  for  the  deterioration.  A recent  Bank
project  is  expected  to address  these  problems  and  provide  substantial
technical  and  financial  support  to  COG  for  the  rehabilitation  and
modernization  of the  communications  subsector. Thus,  the  infrastructural
constraints  that  remain  are  in telecommunications  and  road  transport  in the
northern  region. While  a  number  of current  projects  are  coping  with the
rehabilitation  of these  facilities,  it is  not  clear  that  adequate  attention
is  being  given  to the  planning  of the  country's  long-term  requirements  of
infrastructure  (beyond  the  next  decade).
V.  Private  Sector  Institutions:  Collective  Action  and  Dialogue
A  quick  review  of the  private  sector  institutions  for  collective
action  in  Ghana  shows  that  representative  organizations  are  the  best
organized  and  visible  entities  iLi  this  field. There  are  also a few
professional  associations  concerned  with standards,  education,  etc.,  in
Ghana,  but they  are  not as  well  established  or active  as the  representative
bodies  of business  enterprises.  Private  sector  organizations  which  offer
policy  advice,  undertake  policy  research  or champion  consumer  interests  do
not seem  to  exist.- 46 -
I.,O
The/major  private  sector  representative  bodies  serving  the  private
sector  in  Ghana  are:
1.  the  Ghana  Chamber  of Commerce
2.  the  Ghana  Employers'  Association
3.  the  Association  of  Ghana  Manufacturing  Industries
The  Chamber  of Commerco  and  Employers'  Association  both  have a
membership  of about  six  hundred  each. The  Association  of  Manufacturing
Industries  is larger  with nearly  a thousand  members. There  are  more
traders  and  small  and  medium  enterprises  in  the  Chamber  than  in the
Association  of Manufacturing  Industries.  The  Employers'  Association  is
primarily  concerned  with  labor  and  wage related  issues  whereas  the  Chamber
of Commerce  takes  greater  interest  in trade  an4  tax  related  matters. The
Association  of Manufacturing  Industries  is  more concerned  with industrial
and technology  policies  than  the  other  two. There  is clearly  considerable
overlap  among  these  institutions  with  respect  to  membership  and  areas  and
issues  of concern. But  their  contacts  with  GOG  are  through  different
ministries  which  minimizes  the  problem  of duplication.  Thus the  Chamber
deals  with the  Ministry  of  Trade,  the  Employers'  Association  with the
Ministry  of Labor  and  the  Association  of  Manufacturing  Industries  with the
Ministry  of Industries,  Science  and  Technology. There  is  a Chamber  of
Mines  too  which  links  up with the  Ministry  of Lands  and  Natural  Resources.
All these  as-ociations  have their  elected  boards  and  headquarters  in  Accra
managed  by full  time  staff. Membership  fees  are  their  chief  source  of
income.- 47 -
Among  the  professional  associations  relevant  to  private  sector
industry  are  the  Institute  of Chartered  Accountants,  the  Management
Association  and the  Institution  of Engineers. These  are  patterned  largely
on the  model  of their  U.K. counterparts.  Though  these  organizations  could
potentially  play a  major  role in  the  education  of their  members  and  the
upgrading  of  professional  standards,  it  is fair  to say  that  at present
their  capacity  is  too  weak to  permit  them  to do so.  The Institute  of
Chartered  Accountar.ts  for  example,  has a serious  lack  of qualified  faculty,
books  and teaching  materials  and  funds. The  recently  approved  financial
sector  adjustment  credit  includes  a  modest  provision  for  technical
assistance  to this  Institute. Support  programs  for  other  professional
bodies  are  not in  evidence.
The  primary  function  of the  representative  associations  is to  look
after  the  interests  of their  members  and  to  take  collective  action  that
promotes  their  well  being. Towards  this  end,  they  maintain  close  contacts
with the  relevant  ministries  and  other  agencies  of  GOG, international
agencies,  the  press  and the  public  at large. They  nominate  representatives
to serve  on  government  committees  and  meet  with  ministers  and  senior
officials  occasionally  to resolve  outstanding  issues  and to influence
government  policies  and  decisions  affecting  them. Of the  three  bodies,  the
Association  of Manufacturing  Industries  appears  to  be the  most  active.
They  have irternal  working  groups  for  different  industries,  and  hold
meetings  periodically  to  discuss  matters  of interest  to their  membership.
In  brief,  these  associations  act  as a lobby  for  the  private
business  interests  in  Ghana. While  they  do  have  opportunities  to meet  with-48-
COG officials  at  high levels,  their  overall  assessment  is that  the  private
sector-government  dialogue  could  be better. The only  meeting  business
leaders  have  had  with the  Finance  Secretary  (minister),  for  example, was
when President  Conable  of the  World  Bank  visited  Ghana  over  a  year ago.
Fiscal  and  monetary  policies  have serious  implications  for  the  private
sector. Yet, there  is  no opportunity  for  business  leaders  to  meet  with the
Finance  Secretary  or the  Central  Bank  Govfrnor  for  an exchange  of  views.
Senior  government  officials  could  use such  meetings  to assess  the  business
environment  and the  key issues  that  concern  the  private  sector.
Government-Private  Sector  Dialogue
The  GOG  Task force  on Private  Sector  Development  has  recommended
that  the  Finance  Secretary  should  meet twice  a year  with private  sector
representatives  (before  and  after  the  budget). It  has also  proposed  that
ministries  and  other  public  agencies  should  invite  the  relevant  private
sector  representative  groups  for  regular  discussions  instead  of  waiting  for
a  problem  or complaint  to  arise. Another  suggestion  is that  GOG should
appoint  private  sector  leaders  and  experts  to the  advisory  councils  of
ministries  and the  boards  of  public  institutions.  Institutions  such  as
NBSSI  and  CSIR today  have  boards  composed  solely  of government  officials.
If users  of their  services  are  also  represented  on these  boards,  their
client  orientation  and  the  relevance  of their  services  are  likely  to
improve. The Task  force  has  also  appealed  to the  private  sector  to
strengthen  their  associations  and  to offer  professional  and  specialized
assistance  to member  companies  in  need.- 49 -
Even  if the  private  sector  is limited  in its  capacity  to influence
policy,  one  would  expect  private  sector  associations  to  undertake  studies
to inform,  advise  and  educate  their  members  on appropriate  responses  to  new
developments  and  policy  shifts. There  is  hardly  any  evidence  that
associations  provide  such  advisory  and  information  services  to their
members  today. For  example,  what  members  might  do to  coukter  import
competition,  to exploit  new investment  opportunities  or to improve
productivity  are issues  of interest  to all. Yet, the  associations  seem  to
have done  little  to  address  such  issues,  if  necessary,  with  external
assistance  and to  advise  members  on  how to  deal  with them.  It is
reasonable  to conclude  that  the  private  sector  institutions  in  Ghana  have
not  gone  beyond  the  limited  advocacy  function  characteristic  of
representative  bodies. This  indeed  is  a major  gap  especially  in  view  of
the  absence  of other  autonomous  private  sector  policy  research  and  advisory
institutions  in the  country.
VI.  Conclusion: Strengths.  Weaknesses  and  Directions  for  Change
This  pilot  exercise  has  assessed  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of
the  private  sector  in  Ghana  with  special  reference  to  the  policies,  laws
and  regulations  affecting  the  sector,  the  public  institutions  critical  to
PSD,  and  the  private  sector  institutions  for  collaborative  action  and
dialogue. The  assessment  was  carried  out  within  the  framework  proposed  in
the  PSA  Initiating  Brief  (CECPS,  1988). Of the  five  components  proposed  in
the  framework,  the  last,  namely,  the  operating  legal  system,  was excluded- 50  -
from the  present  exercise  for  lack  of time  and  resources. While  the
overview  of the  private  sector  in  Ghana  covers  all  segments  of the  economy,
the  focus  of the  exercise  has  been on the  private  industry  sector  excluding
mining.
Judged  by the  criteria  of the  shares  of GDP  and  employment,  the
economy  of Ghana  is dominated  by the  private  sector  in spite  of the
considerable  expansion  of the  public  sector  since  the  1960s. In the
absence  of reliable  data,  it is  difficult  to comment  on the  growth,
profitability  and  productivity  of the  private  sector  in  recent  years.
Private  sector  representatives  believe  that  recent  policy  reforms  have
begun  to  create  an enabling  environment  for  private  entrepreneurs.  But
many  policy  and institutional  constraints  and  gaps  in infrastructure  still
remain. This  exercise  shows  that  a dynamic  supply  response  from  the
private  sector  will  emerge  only  when  adequate  steps  are  taken  to deal  with
these  constraints.
Positive  Develooments
It is important  to  start  with an inventory  of the  positive
developments  conducive  to  PSD  which  have  occurred  in  Ghana. Policies  and
institutions  have impacts  which  go  well  beyond  the  private  sector. But
here we shall  confine  our  attention  only  to those  policy  and institutional
reforms  or features  which  are  likely  to  facilitate  PSD. These  provide  a
measure  of the  commitment  and  the  priorities  of GOG in  creating  an enabling
environment  for  the  private  sector.- 51 -
*  COG  has reformed  the  country's  macro-policy  environment  in
important  respects  (e.g.,  exchange  rate  and  trade  reforms,
decontrol  of the  prices  and distribution  of selected  commodities,
reform  of the  investment  code,  tax  and tariff  reforms,  and  the
liberalization  of interest  rates  and  credit  ceilings  which  have
been  noted  in  earlier  sections). In  general,  these  reforms  have
reduced  entry  barriers  and  encouraged  greater  competition  in the
industry  sector. Though  most  of the  policy  reforms  have  multiple
objectives  which  go  beyond  PSD,  they  have in  fact  created  a more
favorable  business  environment  and  a level  playing  field  for  the
private  sector.
*  Important  steps  have  been taken  to  restore  the  confidence  of the
private  sector  in  the  GOG's  policies  and  long-term  commitment  to
PSD.  These  include  the  decision  to repatriate  blocked  capital  and
dividend  arrears  to foreign  investors,  the  decision  to  compensate
individuals  who  were  hurt  by the  demonetization  of 50  cedi  notes,
and  the  decision  to  modify  existing  banking  decrees  to  protect  the
secrecy  of information  pertaining  to  customers.
*  Policy  reforms  pertaining  to foreign  exchange  rate,  trade  and
price  decontrol  have  considerably  eased  the  intensity  of
administrative  control  and  associated  delays  in important  public
agencies  with  which  the  private  sector  has to  deal  on a continuing
basis. Deregulation  in some  areas  has thus  reduced  the  role  of
public  institutions  and  minimized  an important  institutional
constraint  facing  the  private  sector.52
*  Significant  progress  has  been  made in the  past three  years  in
improving  infrastructural  facilities  such  as roads,  railways,
ports  and  power. The  communications  subsector  and the  road  system
in the  northern  region  are  inadequate;  but steps  are  being  taken
to improve  them. The  fact  that  the  entrepreneurs  and  managers
interviewed  hardly  complained  about  infrastructural  problems
speaks  for  itself.
*  The  dialogue  and  consultation  between  the  private  sector  and  GOG
have  begun  to increase,  though  at a  slow  pace.  A recent  positive
development  is the  appointment  of the  Task force  on PSD  by GOG
consisting  of  private  sector  representatives  and  GOG  officials.
Weaknesses
What  are the  constraints  on PSD  that  remain? The assessment
exercise  shows  that  more  steps  beneficial  to the  private  sector  nave  been
made on the  policy  reform  front  than  on the  institutional  front. It is  not
surprising,  therefore,  that the  list  of constraints  below is  dominated  by
institutional  issues.
*  The  single  most "felt-constraint"  on the  private  sector  pertains
to  credit  availability  and  allocation.  The  impact  of the  tight
cL idit  policy  which  makes  sense  in  a period  of  high inflation  has
been  exacerbated  by the  institutional  weaknesses  of the  banks  and
their  poor  supervision.  The slow  pace  of private  investment  and- 53  -
the inability  of entrepreneurs  to  carry  out  their  investment,
import  and  production  plans  stem  to  a large  extent  from  the
current  credit  squeeze  which  has favored  short  term  trading
operations  rather  than  long  term  investment.  The  prospects  for
genuine long-term  investment  seem  rather  bleak  under  these
conditions.  New  and smaller  scale  manufacturing  enterprises  have
been  hurt  more  by this  constraint  than  the  established  and  larger
enterprises  simply  because  banks  know  them  better.
*  The  focus  of  most of the  recent  reforms  has  been  on policies
designed  to create  a level  playing  field  for  the  private  sector.
The  discrimination  in favor  of public  enterprises  has steadily
declined  in  recent  years. The  latter  compete  for  foreign  exchange
at the  auctions  along  with  private  firms. In  matters  of credit,
however,  public  enterprises  continue  to  be more favorably  treated
by banks  because  of government  guarantees.  Policies  to provide
support  services  to the  private  sector  have lagged  behind. Credit
is a case  in  point. But  there  are  several  others  such  as support
for  the  acquisition  of technology,  investment  promotion,  adaptive
research,  training  and  quality  control  which  require  active  public
interventior  or at least  policy  support. Such  policies  are
invariably  dependent  on the  capacity  of certain  institutions  to
deliver  the  services. These  institutions  are  weak in  Ghana  and
the  policies  to  strengthen  them  are  yet to  be thought  through.- 54 .
*  While  the incentives  for  private  investment  have  been
strengthened,  much remains  to  Fe done  to speed  up the investment
approval  process  and  to realign  the  prior  laws  and  regulations
which  govern  the  working  of sector  ministries  with the  provisions
of the  new  Investment  Code. The  GIC's  capacity  to  serve  as a "one
stop  shop"  for  investment  approval  remains  limited  in  view  of its
legal  and regulatory  constraints  and  coordination  problems  with
other  ministries. Complex  regulations  by multiple  agencies  are  a
problem  for  small  scale  entrepreneurs  too. As lotig  as these
institutional  constraints  exist,  the  supply  response  of  private
investors  will remain  weak though  the  incentive  policies  are  in
place. NRS is the  only  public  agency  which  has  made some  progress
on  both the  policy  and  institutional  fronts.
*  Private  sector  confidence  in  GOG  policies  and their  stability
continues  to  be a  problem. Long-term  political  stability  is  a key
determinant  of  confidence. But  even  if stability  improves,  lack
of information  could  aggravate  tbe  situation  as, for  example,  when
a govLrnment  fails  to  communicate  new  policies  and  decisions
adequatelv  to  potential  investors.  A case in  point  is  the  policy
decision  to  repatriate  blocked  funds. GOG  has  been implementing
this  policy,  but  without  making  a  public  statement  which  would
have eliminated  much  uncertainty  in the  minds  of potential
investors. Even  with  a public  information  campaign,  it is  not
easy  to restore  confidence  in the  short  run. This  problem  will  be
even  more  serious  if there  are  gaps in  the  basic  legal  framework- 55 -
and  uncertainties  about  the  enforcement  of the  law. As noted
earlier,  an  assessment  of the  operating  legal  system  from  this
standpoint  was  not  attempted  in  this  study.
*  The  private  sector  associations  for  collaborative  action  in  Ghana
are  primarily  of the  rep-esentative  type. Their  capacity  to
dialogue  with  GOG  and influence  policies  that  affect  the  private
sector  is  extremely  limited. They  do not  undertake  serious
studies  relevant  to  PSD  nor  tap  local  experts  and  institutions  for
criticizing  iolicies. Professional  associations  relevant  to PSD
also  have  limited  capacity  to  assist  members  in their  growth  and
to  upgrade  standards. The  small  scale  segment  of the  private
sector  has  no association  of its  own  for  representative  and
developmental  purposes. There  is  no forum  for  small  scale
entrepreneurs  to  express  their  views,  to influence  policy  or to
promote  collaborative  action.
*  An important  gap  in the  government-private  sector  dialogue  is  the
lack  of institutional  arrangements  for  the  private  sector  leaders
to meet  with the  senior  GOG  officials  concerned  with the
macroeconomic  policies  which  impinge  on  private  sector
performance.  There  is  no formal  contact  between  the  private
sector  and  the  Finance  Secretary  and the  Central  Bank  Governor  who
are  most concerned  with  the  fiscal,  monetary  and  credit  policies
of the  country. Private  sector  leaders  and  experts  are  also  not
found  on the  boards  and  councils  of many  public  agencies  whose- 56 -
functions  and  services  are  critical  to PSD. An important
opportunity  for  these  agencies  to improve  their  services  and
relevance  through  the  feedback  and  advice  of user  groups  has thus
been  missed. These  weaknesses  generally  tend  to  make  the
adaptation  and  implementation  of  policies  more  difficult  and  to
limit  the  prospects  for  improving  private  sector  confidence  in the
country's  policies  and institutions.
Directions  for  Change
An important  finding  of the  assessment  is that  at the  present
juncture  the  private  sector  in  Ghana  is  likely  to  be held  back  more  by
institutional  constraints  than  by policy  inadequacies.  This is  not  to say
that  further  policy  reforms  are  not required  or that  the  need for  policy
changes  will  not  once  again  become  a  high  priority  for  GOG. The  point  is
that  in general  further  refinements  of  policy  are  likely  to  yield  much less
for  PSD  at this  stage  than  reforms  on the  institutional  front  simply
because  adequate  attention  to institutional  issues  has  not  yet  been given.
The  recommendations  offered  below  reflect  this  assessment.
1)  The first  priority  in terms  of action  by GOG should  be given  to
the  reform  of the  financial  sector  and  of credit  policy  so  as to augment
the  supply  of resources  for  long-term  investment  and  production. The  small
scale  subsector  whose  access  to the  formal  credit  system  remains  limited
deserves  special  attention  in this  regard. The speedy  development  of
indigenous  business  enterprises  will  require  new institutional  mechanisms- 57 -
for  resource  mobilization  and  intermediation,  and  facilities  to  ensure
efficient  and  equitable  access  to  credit  to  the  small  and  medium  local
entrepreneurs.
2)  The  effective  functioning  of the  GIC is  critical  to  PSD in  Ghana.
The  second  priority  should,  therefore,  be to remove  the  impediments  which
prevent  the  GIC from  being  a "one  stop  shop"  for  potential  entrepreneurs,
both  for  investment  promotion  and  approval. The starting  point  here should
be the  review  of the  sector  specific  legislation  (prior  to the  Ipvestment
Code)  governing  certain  ministries  which  still  seem  to  conflict  with the
Code.  This  review  should  be used to  abrogate  or  amend  such  legislation  so
that  the  processing  of investment  approvals  can  proceed  smoothly.
Immediate  steps  must  be taken  also  for  strengthening  the  GIC's  capacity  for
investment  promotion  both locally  and  abroad. These  are  tasks  in  which  the
GIC  will  require  specialized  external  assistance. Expert  advice  with
respect  to  promotional  strategies  and  regulatory  and  procedural
improvements,  staff  training  and  exposure  to  country  experiences  elsewhere,
and  financial  support  for  studies  of investment  opportunities  are  among  its
priority  needs. The  GIC  should  be encouraged  to  utilize  the  assistance
offered  by the  Bank  and  the  Irish  Development  Authority  to  meet these
needs.
3)  The Investment  Code  of Ghana  has  now  been in  operation  for  about
three  years. The  third  priority  action  in  support  of PSD  is  to review  its
provisions  and  reguiations  together  with  other  relevant  ministries  (e.g.,
Industry,  Agriculture  including  Fisheries,  Trade,  Transport,  Tourism,  NRS,- 58  -
etc.),  to identify  the  sections  of the  Code  which  require  amendments  or
subsidiary  legislation  to improve  the  processing  of investment  proposals
and  to revise  the  Code  and its  regulations  in light  of the  findings. This
review  could  be used also  for  modifying  the  nature  and  scope  of incentives.
For  example,  the  case  for  reducing  the  Code's  bias in  favor  of capital
intensive  investments  could  be examined  in the  course  of the  review. The
relevance  of some  of the  incentives  in light  of the  recent  tax  and  tariff
reforms  also  needs  to  be reviewed. Similarly,  the  Companies  Code  of 1963
must  be reviewed  and  updated  in  tune  with the  new  policy  regime.
4)  The  assessment  of the  individual  institutions  presented  in this
report  is  based  on  existing  documentation  and  very  limited  fieldwork.
Since  several  public  institutions  have  been identified  as  critical  to  PSD,
an important  task  is to  assess  the  institutional  capacities  and  needs  of
the  key agencies  and  to strengthen  them  to  play their  redefined  roles. The
fourth  priority,  therefore,  is to  complete  a systematic  assessment  of,  and
to  offer  proposals  for  the  reform  of the  key  public  institutions  (building
on existing  studies  where  available)  in  a  phased  manner  so that  they  can  be
of greater  service  to  the  private  sector. This  exercise  should  consist  of
the  following  steps:
a.  agreement  on the  institutions  to  be assessed;
b.  redefinition  of the  objectives  of the  institution  in  relation  to
the  private  sector  and  in  light  of the  recent  policy,  legal  and
regulatory  reforms;- 59 -
c.  redesign  of the  basic  tasks  and  activities  of the  institution  in
relation  to the  private  sector  and  the  elimination  of irrelevant
functions  in  light  of the  analysis;
d.  reform  of the  procedures  necessary  to  serve  the  private  sector
better;
e.  realignment  of the  structure  of its  organization,  if  necessary,  to
perform  the  proposed  set  of functions;
f.  mechanisms  for  client  linkages  (promotional  and  advisory  role)  and
for  feedback  from  client  groups;
g.  training  to  equip  the  staff  to  perform  their  functions
effectively;
h.  design  of internal  information  and  control  systems;
i.  creation  of boards  or advisory  councils  to oversee  its  performance
or occasional  review  groups  to assess  its  progress;  and
j.  allocation  of resources  to  do all  of the  above  and  to recruit
staff  as required  in light  of the  assessment..
This indeed  is  a detailed  and  time-consuming  task. There  exists,  however,
a fairly  good  diagnosis  of the  needs  of a few  agencies  such  as the  GIC  and- 60-
NRS.  Hopefully,  the  Bank's  financial  sector  adjustment  operation  will
provide  a  better  understanding  of the  needs  of the  key  financial
institutions.  What remain  to  be assessed  then  are  NBSSI,  research  and
training  institutions  and  the  functions  and  bureaus  of the  relevant  sector
ministries  which  have  most to  do with  the  private  sector. In all  cases,  it
is important  at the  outset  to adopt  policies  which  will  minimize  the
dependence  of the  private  sector  on  public  institutions  wherever
appropriate. It is  only  thus  that  superfluous  institutions  can  be
eliminated  and  the  functions,  regulations  and  procedures  of the  essential
ones  made simpler  and  more  efficient.
5)  The  public  institutions  discussed  in this  report  are  unlikely  to
become  strong  and  useful  aids to  PSD  unless  an integrated  view of their
long-term  needs  is taken  and the  strategies  for  their  development  are
carefully  planned  and  supported. The  fifth  priority,  therefore,  is to
encourage  donors  to take  a long-term  view  of the  needs  of the  key  public
institutions  in  Ghana.  Sustainability  of institutions  should  be the  major
rationale  for  donor  assistance.  In the  past,  donors,  including  the  Bank,
have  offered  short-term  support  to these  agencies  in relation  to  activities
of special  interest  to them. While  this  meets  immediate  donor  concerns,  it
is  doubtful  that  such  limited  short-term  assistance  will  bring  about
sustainable  institutional  development.  Donor  support  should  focus  more  on
the  core support  and  long-term  actions  required  for  the  survival  and  growth
of the  institutions.- 61 -
6)  The  existing  private  sector  associations  shnuld  be encouraged  to
set  up suitable  institutional  mechanisms  to  undertake  serious  studies  of
their  common  problems  and  to  use them  to  dialogue  with  GOG.  There  is a
case  for  developing  their  capacity  to  play  a proactive  role  in this  area
especially  in the  absence  of other  autonomous  policy  research  institutions.
One option  is to set  up a private  foundation  under  the  auspices  of the
three  associations  and finance  it  through  industry  contributions.  Research
and  publication  activities  could  then  be organized  through  the foundation.
This  will enable  the  associations  to  tap  the  expertise  available  in the
country  and to  undertake  studies  on  current  policy  issues  and  disseminate
or  use their  findings  to influence  policies  of relevance  to the  private
sector. Similarly,  as proposed  by the  GOG  Task  force  on PSD,  private
sector  representatives  should  be enabled  to  discuss  their  problems  and
policy  concerns  with senior  GOG  officials. Their  participation  in
government  committees  and  in the  boards  of  public  institutions  also
deserves  to  be increased. Private  sector-government  dialogue  should  be
seen  as an important  part  of the  process  of  building  up  private  sector
confidence  in  Ghana.
7)  Small  scale  industries  should  be encouraged  to establish  their  own
association  for  collaborative  action  and  dialogue  with GOG,  and  to  provide
information  and  advisory  services  to  members  in  different  regions. At
present,  there  is  no forum  for  the  small  scale  entrepreneurs  to get
together  and  to  make their  voice  heard  by the  GOG.  It is  too  much to
expect  that  associations  dominated  by large  scale  enterprises  will
adequately  champion  the  cause  of the  small  scale  sector  or allocate- 62 -
resources  to study  and  deal  with  its  problems. The  NBSSI  is a government
body  with  no representation  from  entrepreneurs.  It is certainly  no
substitute  for  a  proper  industry  association.  To  begin  with,  an
association  of small  scale  industries  may  be created  in a  major  center  to
be followed  by similar  groups  in  other  industry  centers. A national
association  should  really  be a federation  of active  local  groups.
VII.  Methodological  Implications  for  PSA  in Other  Countries
This  pilot  exercise  was  planned  as  a low  cost  effort  to  be
completed  in  a period  of six  months. The 17 staffweeks  spent  on the
exercise  consisted  of seven  weeks  of a local  consultant  in  Accra  and  ten
weeks  of a staff  member  who spent  six  of the  ten  weeks  in  Ghana  for
fieldwork  and to  participate  in  SAL  II  activities.  The  consultant  cost
came  to $2,000. The  staff  member  visited  Ghana  three  times  in the  course
of the  assessment.  This low  cost  effort  was  made  possible  by the  prior
work  that  had already  been  done  on several  aspects  of the  private  sector  in
Ghana. No large-scale  surveys  or interviews,  for  example,  were  undertaken
in  Ghana  for  this  exercise. In  countries  where  such  prior  work  by the  Bank
or governments  has not  been  done,  more time  and  resources  will  have to  be
provided  for  a comparable  PSA  exercise.
The  basic  approach  and  guidelines  proposed  in  the  PSA  Initiating
Brief  were  found  useful  i'n  the  conduct  of the  pilot  exercise. The  overview
paper  on the  privute  sector  based  chiefly  on published  data  was  completed- 63  -
in four  months. The early  findings  of this  paper  were  used to  narrow  the
scope  of the  assessment  to the  industry  sector. The  availability  of data
relevant  to industry  from  the  ongoing  Bank  economic  and  sector  work  and
lending  operations  facilitated  the  fieldwork  and  analysis  immensely.
Sources  of Data  and  Methods
Even though  they  are  more  available  than  in  most  of its
neighboring  countries,  published  data  on the  private  sector  are  extremely
scarce  in  Ghana. The  statistical  system  is  weak  and  available  data  are
often  out  of date.  It  was therefore  necessary  to generate  the  basic  data
for  PSA in  Ghana  from  a  variety  of sources:
(1)  The data  for  the  general  overview  of the  private  sector  in  Ghana
were  assembled  by a local  consultant  from  published  sources,  unpublished
government  reports  and  through  interviews  with government  officials  and
private  sector  leaders,  representatives  and  experts. 9
(2)  A second  and  an extremely  important  source  was the  Bank/IFC  Group
whose  economic  and  sector  work  and  studies  undertaken  for  specific  lending
operations  constituted  a rich  repository  of data  on  different  dimensions  of
the  private  sector. Thus,  the  Bank's  studies  in connection  with its
9/ Local  consultants  are  more  efficient  for  this  purpose  than  any  other
alternative  in  view of their  local  knowledge  and  contacts  and  relatively
low  cost.- 64
adjustment  operations  (structural  adjustment,  industrial  sector  adjustment,
and  financial  sector  adjustment,  and  the  preparatory  work  done  for  the
small  and  medium  industries  project)  were an important  and  timely  source  of
data for  the  PSA  exercise. None  of these  focussed  exclusively  on the
private  sector;  but it  was  not  difficult  to  sift  out  the  key issues  and
insights  relevant  to  PSD.  IFC's  reports  on the  investment  climate  and  on
the  Ghana  Investments  Centre  (GIC)  was a  useful  supplement  to the  Bank's
work.10
(3)  Two studies  done  by local  institutions  in  Ghana  on some  aspects  of
PSD  were the  third  source  of  data  for  the  PSA  exercise. Firstly,  in 1988,
GOG  appointed  a task  force  on PSD  consisting  of  government  officials  and
private  sector  leaders  and  representatives  to  assess  the  problems  being
faced  by the  private  sector  and to  recommend  actions  to  resolve  them  and to
improve  the  dialogue  between  the  private  sector  and the  Government.  The
motivation  for  the  appointment  of the  task  force  was the  need  to articulate
GOG's  position  on this  subject  as a  basis  for  subsequent  discussion  with
the  Bank  on the  SAC  II  program. The  report  of the  task  force  is
significant  both  for  its  proposals  on PSD  and  for  the  process  used  by GOG
to generate  them. The  second  study  drawn  on  was Small  Scale  Industries  and
10/  Bank  reports  used  in this  exercise  included  the  President's  Report  on
the  Industrial  Sector  Adiustment  Credit  for  Ghana  (1986),  President's
Report  on the  Financial  Sector  Adjustment  Credit  for  Ghana  (1988),
Report  on the  SEM  Development  Project,  several  reports  prepared  for  SAC
II (Ghana,  87-88)  and  the  IFC  Reports  on the  Ghana  Investment  Centre
(1986-97).- 65 -
Decentralization  in Ghana  (1985),  prepared  by the  University  of Ghana;  this
is  the  only  fairly  recent  and  systematic  survey  of the  small  scale  sector
available  in  Ghatra.
(4)  The fourth  source  of data  was the  fieldwork  undertaken  by CECPS  as
part  of the  PSA  exercise. In  all,  six  staffweeks  (one  staff  member  only)
were devoted  to this  work in  Ghana  over  a period  of eight  months. The
endeavor  was  to  build  on the  available  work of the  Bank  Group;  to  refine
the  diagnosis  and  fill  in the  gaps  through  fieldwork,  and  to generate
actionable  ideas  on PSD  for  inclusion  in  the  SAC  II  program. An important
feature  of this  part  of the  exercise  was the  substantial  amount  of field
mission  time  allocated  to interviews  with  private  entrepreneurs,  managers
and  association  representatives  with  a view to  understanding  the  problems
from  their  perspective. Both  individual  and "focus  group"  interviews  were
held for  this  purpose. Field  missions  were  used  also  to initiate  the
overview  of the  private  sector  by a local  consultant  and  to supervise  the
progress  of  his  work.
The sequence  of steps  adopted  in the  pilot  PSA  exercise  were as
follows:
(1)  Review  of the  existing  studies  relevant  to  PSD  done  by the  Bank
Group,  and  discussions  with the  concerned  staff;
(2)  Assessment  of the  private  sector  in  Ghana  based  on  available  data
on the  economy;-66  -
(3)  Field  interviews  to identify  and  assess  the  constraints  on PSD  and
to generate  ideas  for  action  in  support  of PSD;  and
(4)  Discussions  with relevant  GOG  officials  on the  adequacy  of the
diagnosis  and  the  feasibility  and  appropriateness  of the  proposed
actions  and  directions  for  change.
Major  Lessons
A number  of lessons  have  been learned  from  this  exercise  which
might  be useful  for  similar  work in other  countries.
1)  A comprehensive  private  sector  assessment  that  covers  all  segments
of the  economy  will require  separate  workingi  groups  for  each
segment. This  clearly  will  entail  more  time  and  money,  but will
be difficult  to  complete  if the  ministries  and  other  agencies
concerned  with  each  and  every  sector  activity  do  not cooperate
.with  equal  enthusiasm.  If one  or two  sectors  lag  behind,  timely
completion  of.the  exercise  will  be in  jeopardy. Hence  a phased
approach  may  have some  merit  if several  sectors  are  to  be
assessed.
2)  The five  components  in the  assessment  exercise  are interrelated.
Hence  it is  important  that  they  are  undertaken  simultaneously  to
the  extent  possible. The  judgement  on the  components  to be
assessed  must  take  into  account  the  views  expressed  by the  private- 67 -
entrepreneurs  who  have considerable  local  knowledge. In the
present  case,  policies  and  institutions  pertaining  to
infrastructure  were not  examined  mainly  because  private
entrepreneurs  did  not  raise  them  as  a serious  issue. On the  other
hand,  the  operating  legal  system  was  not assessed  for  lack  of time
and  resources. In  retrospect,  it appears  that  the  inclusion  of
the  legal  system  might  have  been  beneficial  to the  exercise  since
it is not  now certain  whether  entrepreneurs  are  also  constrained
by more  basic  legal  impediments  beyond  the  laws  and  regulations
referred  to in this  report. Similarly,  an assessment  of  policies
alone  does  not  go far  as institutional  constraints  may  well limit
their  influence  on private  sector  response. There  is  merit,
therefore,  in considering  the  five  components  as an interrelated
set.
3)  The  PSA  Initiating  Brief  treated  infrastructure  under  two
components,  namely,  policies  and  public  institutions.  In
countries  where  infrastructure  appears  to  be a major  constraint
2rlma  facie,  there  is  merit  in investigating  it as  a separate
component. If  basic  data  do  not  exist,  this  will  be a  difficult
task.  Private  entrepreneurs  may  point  out  the  problems,  but  will
seldom  have  much information  or an  overview  of the  requirements
and  gaps.
4)  In this  type  of exercise,  the  key institutions  should  be assessed,
but it is  too  much to  expect  that  every  relevant  institution  can- 68
be examined  in  depth. A detailed  assessment  should  emerge  as  a
recommendation  of the  exercise. On the  other  hand,  the  broad
exercise  should  map  out  the  relevant  range  of institutions,
categorize  them  and set  priorities  for  detailed  work  based  on a
preliminary  diagnosis. Invariably,  specialists  will  be required
to  complete  the  detailed  assessment  of individual  institutions,
their  laws  and  regulations.
5)  An assessment  exercise  of this  scope  cannot  be done  without  the
host  government's  commitment  and  cooperation.  The  preparatory
work  should  be used to  make  an assessment  of the  government's
interest  and  the  role  it is  willing  to  play in this  endeavor. In
the  Ghana  case,  the  government  was seriously  interested  and  played
an  active  role  at least  in some  respects. Linking  up the  exercise
with the  SAL  preparatory  work  reinforced  GOG's  interest. The
creation  of the  Task  force  on  PSD  by GOG  is a  case in  point  and
was  motivated  by the  SAL  operation. The  very  process  of bringing
government  officials  and  private  sector  leaders  was  a supportive
move of some  significance.  It  will  be useful  also to  have  private
sector's  own  associations  contribute  ideas  through  ad hoc  working
groups  set  up for  this  purpose. This,  however,  was  not  done in
the  Ghana  exercise.
6)  Interviews  with  private  sector  participants  should  play  a major
role  in PSA.  It is  possible  to learn  much from  reports  and
meetings  with government  officials. But  the  present  exercise- 69  -
shows  clearly  that  the  constraints  facing  the  private  sector  and
some  of the  answers  to  deal  with them  are  best articulated  by
private  entrepreneurs  themselves.  Interviews  with individual
entrepreneurs  and  managers  should  therefore  be an essential  part
of the  PSA  methodology. However,  since  this  can  be time  consuming
and  costly,  good  use  should  be made of the  technique  of "focus
groups  interviews.  In Ghana,  focus  groups  drawn  from  different
industry  segments  were interviewed.  This  helped  the  interviewer
to assess  a cross  section  of  views  and  to sense  whether  consensus
existed  on certain  key issues. Intermediaries  such  as association
officials  are  also  useful  sources  of information,  but are  not  a
substitute  for  what  entrepreneurs  can  offer,  individually  and  in
small  groups. An 'assessment  launch"  workshop  with selected
businessmen  may  be a  useful  approach.
7)  In countries  where  much  prior  knowledge  of the  private  sector  does
not exist,  a single  person  could  initiate  PSA  with  a field  mission
to  ascertain  the  scope  of the  work and  the  components  which
deserve  priority. This initial  assessment  should  be used to
decide  on the  type  of team  that  should  be organized  to  undertake
PSA.  The team  should  preferably  be  headed  by a generalist  and
consist  of two  other  members  who  have  some  expertise  in assessing
policies  and institutions.  If the  legal  system  and  infrastructure
are  perceived  to  be priority  problems,  specialists  may  be added  to
examine  the  relevant  dimensions.  The initial  mission  could  be- 70 -
used also  to identify  a local  consultant  to review  the  readily
available  data  on the  private  sector. In  Ghana,  a PSA  team  was
not  deployed  mainly  because  the  Bank's  prior  work relevant  to  PSA
was considerable.  The  composition  and  size  of the  team  should  be
adapted  to the  extent  of  knowledge  on the  private  sector  that
exists  in  a given  country.-71  -
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Private  sector  development  (PSD)  ranks  high  among  the  tasks  of the
World  Bank today. The  Bank's  ability  to  contribute  to PSD  in countries
interested  in the  st,bject  will depend  not  only  on its  financial  resources,
but  also  on its  understanding  of the  problems  and  constraints  which  inhibit
the  private  sector  in  LDCs,  and its  strategies  to  overcome  these
impediments  in  collaboration  with the  governments  of the  countries
concerned. As part  of country  economic  and  sector  work,  some  of these
issues  are  dealt  with  by the  Bank  staff,  especially  the  constraints  imposed
by the  macro-policy  environment  on the  private  sector. To the  extent  that
there  are  constraints  other  than  policies  and  regulations  which  inhibit  PSD
in some  countries,  there  is  a case for  undertaking  a  more  comprehensive
analysis  of the  private  sector's  problems  and  their  interrelationships  than
is  normally  done.  The  approach  to  private  sector  assessment  proposed  below
will not  only  build  on the  ongoing  econcmic  and  sector  work of country
departments,  but also  fill  the  gaps  in  our  knowledge  about  the  private
sector  and  provide  a  basis  for  identifying  a strategy  and  specific  Bank
activities  to  promote  PSD. The  purpose  of 4this  initiating  brief  is to
outline  the  nature,  scope  and  methodology  of private  sector  assessment.  The
preconditions  for  the  development  of the  private  sector  in  LDCs  and  a  menu
of approaches  to PSD  are  briefly  discussed  as a backdrop  against  which  a
framework  for  private  sector  assessment  is  presented.
I.  Nature  and  ScoRe  of the  Private  Sector
There  is a growing  realization  in  many  governments  that  the
complex  tasks  of development  cannot  be achieved  through  an exclusive
reliance  on  public  enterprises  or other  public  entities,  and that  the
potential  of the  private  sector  should  be harnessed  more fully  in  meeting
the  development  needs  of society. The  dilemma  of  many  LDCs,  however,  is
that  the  size,  competence  and  institutional  capacity  of their  private
sector  are  not  equal  to the  demands  of this  task. Governments'  capacity  to
plan and  manage  policies  which  affect  the  private  sector  continues  to  be
limited  in  many countries.
On the  other  hand,  the  private  sector  inherited  by the  LDC
governments  on the  eve  of their  independence  have  undergone  changes  over
the  past  two  or three  decades. Enteepreneurs  have  become  more  numerous  and
have gained  in experience.  The supply  of educated  manpower  has increaaed.
Infrastructure  facilities  have  .been  expanded. Though  the  pace  of progress
may  have  been slow,  the  capacities  created  and  the  learning  that  has- 73 -
occurred  in the  private  sector,  and  the  problems  and  constraints  that
remain,  deserve  to  be assessed  systematically  as a basis  for  designing  a
strategy  for  accelerated  private  sector  development.  In fact,  this  should
be an essential  component  of the  country  strategy  in  all  cases  where
private  sector  development  is  perceived  to  be a priority.
Private  Sector  Development  (PSD)  is often  viewed  as pertaining  to
the  realm  of organized  industry  and  commerce  alone. From  a  national
perspective,  it is appropriate  to  broaden  the  scope  of concern  to include
all  areas  or sectors  of activity  in  which  private  initiative  and
participation  have  a useful  role.  In  most  countries,  the  private  sector
has relevance  not  only to industry,  finance  and trade,  but also
agriculture,  education,  health  and  other  social  services. All these  large
scale,  organized  activities  may  co-exist  with a  wide range  of informal
activities  which  operate  almost  as an  underground  economy  beyond  the  pale
of law.  There  are  several  countries  where  the  private  sector  plays  a non-
trivial  role  in the  fields  of education,  health  and infrastructural
services  such  as transport.
The  indigenous  and  ethnic  dimensions  of the  private  sector  also
need  to  be noted. Some  governments  give  priority  to their  "indigenous"
private  sector,  thus  excluding  or offering  a limited  role  to the  "foreign"
private  sector. Within  the  indigenous  private  sector,  some  ethnic  groups
may  be regarded  by the  governments  concerned  as more  deserving  of support
than  others. Irrespective  of the  merits  of the  case,  the  point  is that  the
foreign-indigenous  dichotomy  of the  private  sector  is  also  a relevant  issue
in this  context. In its  broadest  sense,  then,  private  sector  refers  to a
wide spectrum  of organized  (indigenous  and  foreign),  and  unorganized
(informal),  small  scale  activities  operating  in  markets  with  varying
degrees  of competition.  The  scope  and  specific  mix  of such  private  sector
activities  tend  to  vary  widely  from  one  country  to  another. Policies  and
programs  for  PSD will  therefore  have  to be adapted  to  meet their  unique
needs.
II.  Reauirements  of PSD
In recent  years,  privatization  of  public  enterprises  has  been
advocated  as an important  means  to augment  the  role  of the  private  sector
in LDCs. However,  the  limited  capacity  and  resources  of the  private  sector
in  many  LDCs,  the  absence  of well  developed  capital  markets,  political
sensitivity  to the  sale  of public  enterprises  to foreign  or  minority
private  interests,  opposition  to divestiture  by powerful  domestic  interest
groups  such  as trade  unions  and  the  bureaucracy,  the  lack  of attention  of
many  LDC  governments  to  prepare  the  ground  adequately  for  divestiture  and
their  limited  capacity  to  negotiate  privatization  deals  effectively  are
among  the  major  factors  for  the  slow  pace  of  privatization  in the
developing  world.  For  all  these  reasons,  while  the  privatization  of  public
enterprises  could  make  a modest  contribution  to  enlarging  the  role  of the
private  sector  in  a  number  of LDCs,  there  is  no doubt  that  a  more
comprehensive  set  of actions  on other  fronts  will  be necessary  to achieve
PSD  of a  broad  based  nature.- 74 -
The size,  resources  and  vigor  of the  private  sector  vary
considerably  from  one  LDC  to another. Nevertheless,  the  basic  elements
which  influence  PSD  are  common  to all  countries. These  are:  competitive
markets,  an adequate  supply  of entrepreneurs,  availability  of capital,
efficient  infrastructural  facilities,  and  a supportive  legal  and
institutional  framework.
The  policies,  laws  and  regulations  of  country  have,  in  general,  a
direct  effect  on all  the  basic  elements  listed  above. The  capacity  and
quality  of  management  of the  public  institutions  implementing  laws  and
regulations,  the  quality  of the  private  sector  institutions  which  provide
common  services  to their  constituents,  and  the  operating  legal  system  of
the  country  also  tend  to impact  on all  or  most  of these  elements. An
analysis  of these  factors  will,  therefore,  provide  useful  insights  into  the
barriiers  that  constrain  PSD  in  LDCs.
Policies.  Laws  and  Regulations
Inappropriate  policies,  laws  and  regulations  affecting  private
activities  tend  to create  two  types  of  barriers  to the  development  of the
private  sector:  (1)  conventional  barriers  to entry  and  exit  which  tend  to
limit  potential  competition  and  protect  the  beneficiaries  of the  system  at
the  expense  of society  at large;  and (2)  physical  controls  on the
acquisition  of technology,  capital  and  raw  materials  which  tend  to  cause
allocational  and  x-inefficiencies.  Even if  these  barriers  are  removed,  PSD
may  not  occur  without  governments  taking  the  initiative  to  provide  positive
incentives  and  assistance  to local  entrepreneurs.  Thus a reasonable
assurance  of a fair  return  or reward  for  investment  and  labor,  and
stability  of  policies  tend  to act  as incentives  for  the  private  sector  to
perform  better. Even  when  entry  barriers  are  removed,  for  example,  if
taxes  are  too  high or  a threat  of expropriation  of assets  exists,
incentives  for  PSD  get  weakened. Similarly,  policies  that  facilitate  the
provision  of infrastructural  facilities,  development  of the  capital  market
and  related  institutions  which  provide  funds  and  financial  services,  and
the  supply  of skilled  manpower  are  an essential  requirement  of PSD.
Needless  to say,  in  extremely  poor  and  small  countries,  private
entrepreneurship  and  managerial  capacity  tend  to  be scarce  resources  and
the  removal  of barriers  or provision  of incentives  may  not  bring  about
indigenous  PSD  in the  short  run in  such  settings. There  is clearly  a  need
for  a longer  term  perspective  on PSD  in such  cases  and  a  willingness  to
create  opportunities  for  learning  through  innovative  forms  of assistance
and  partnership  between  countries  and  external  donors  or collaborators.
Public  Sector  Institutions
An important  component  of a supportive  institutional  framework  is
the  capacity  of the  country's  public  institutions,  both economic  and
financial,  to  plan  and implement  the  policies,  laws  and  regulations
affecting  the  private  sector. An exclusive  focus  on policy  reform  as a- 75 -
means  to  achieve  PSD is  an inadequate  approach  to PSD  given  the  realities
of the  developing  world. The  liberalization  of  policies  in some  countries
has led  to the  lifting  of entry  barriers,  deregulation  of  previously
controlled  activities  including  financial  operations,  and  restructured
public  investment  policies. But  liberalization  does  not necessarily  lead
to an end  of all  regulations. For  example,  where  market  power  is a
problem,  governments  need to  play  a regulatory  role.  Public  agencies  may
be required  in almost  all  cases  to monitor  and  assist  the  process  of PSD.
Regulatory  agencies  (e.g.  monopoly  commissions,  departments  of company  law,
industrial  licensing  agencies,  etc.),  and  developmental  and  promotional
institutions  (e.g.  investment  promotion  centers,  development  banks,  trade
development  agencies,  industrial  extension  bureaus,  etc.)  are  examples  of
such  public  institutions.  There  is  considerable  evidence  to show  that  even
when  policies  are  well conceived,  the  faulty  design  of laws,  regulations
and  procedures,  and  their  poor implementation  by public  agencies  tend  to
have an adverse  impact  on PSD. Regulations  and  the  procedures  for  their
implementation  may  be so cumbersome  and  time  consuming  from  the  standpoint
of  entrepreneurs  that  they  are  frustrated  and  turn  to  the  underground
economy  and  other  shortcuts  which  tend  to  breed  corruption. The
information  and  advice  required  by private  entrepreneurs  to  respond  to
opportunities  and  constraints  in the  economy  may  not  be readily  available
to  all,  especially  when the  capacity  of the  country's  public  and  private
sector  institutions  is limited. It is  for  these  reasons  that  attention
should  be paid  not  only  to the  adequacy  of the  policy  and  regulatory
framework  but  also  the  capacity  and incentives  of the  public  institutions
relevant  to  PSD.
Private  Sector  Institutions
There  are,  of course,  limits  to  the  extent  to  which  public  sector
institutions  can  be reformed. Established  traditions  and  ways of doing
business,  vested  interests  of  powerful  groups  and  the  lack  of pressure  from
users/clients  for  greater  public  accountability  are factors  which tend  to
delay  the  process  of reform. On the  other  hand,  where  an organized  private
sector  exists  (e.g.  industrial  or  commercial  enterprises,  NGOs,  etc.),  it
is  possible  for  its  members  to  have an influence  on the  policy  and
institutional  environments  of their  countries  through  collaborative  action.
Such  collective  endeavours  may  take  the  form  of:  (a)  representative
organizations  such  as  chambers  of commerce,  and  small  industry
associations;  (b)  problem  solving  and  policy  advisory  groups  such  as
private  foundations  and  consultancy  organizations  (such  private
organizations  exist  in several  Latin  American  and  Asian  countries);
(c)  professional  associations  which  uphold  standards  and  educate  their
members  (e.g.,  associations  of accountants,  auditors,  engineers,  managers,
etc.);  (d)  resource  mobilizing  and  allocating  bodies  such  as stock
exchanges  and  private  financial  institutions;  and (e)  consumer  related
movements  which  demand  service  and  quality. The  creation  and  sustenance  of
such  common  service  organizations  require  much  time,  resources  and team
effort. The case  for  strengthening  their  role in  LDCs  is all  the  greater- 76 -
as they  could  be an important  aid  to  PSD through  their  influence  on the
policy  and institutional  environment  in  which  they  operate  and  the  sense  of
self  reliance  they  help engender  in the  private  sector  through
collaborative  action. Needless  to say,  there  is the  risk  that  organized
private  sector  may  use its  influence  against  much  needed  policy  reforms  or
to  protect  its  sectional  interests,  and  governments  need to  be alert  to
keep  such tendencies  in  check.
The  Operating  Legal  System
Inadequacies  in the  operating  legal  system  of a country  often
prevents  the  effective  implementation  of its  policies,  laws  and
regulations.  Needless  to add,  they  have  adverse  effects  on  many sectors  of
private  economic  activity. Gaps in the  basic  legal  framework  necessary  for
PSD including  property  rights  (ownership,  transfer  and  bankruptcy),
contractual  rights,  law  of associations,  criminal  law,  labor  laws,  problems
of dispute settlement  and  enforcement  of law,  etc.,  can  have adverse
motivational  effects  on entrepreneurs,  and  impair  the  efficient  operation
of markets. Furthermore,  inefficiencies  in the  administration  and
enforcement  of the  law  tend  to cause  a crisis  of public  confidence  as it  is
the  observed  administration  of law  that  influences  public  behavior. Hence,
gaps  in the  "operating"  legal  system  may  well shed  light  on the  reasons  for
the  poor  performance  of markets,  the  weak response  of entrepreneurs  and  the
failure  to  mobilize  capital  in  a given  country.
ITI. A Menu  of PSD  AoDroaches
The  requirements  of PSD  in  different  LDCs  will  vary according  to
the  relative  importance  and severity  of  problems  facing  the  private  sector.
Within  the  private  sector,  some  segments  may  he weaker  and less  organized
than  others. In  many LDCs,  overregulation  of the  economy  has  been
recognized  as a  major  constraint  on the  working  of the  private  sector.
Deregulation  has therefore  been  proposed  as an approach  to  deal  with  this
problem. While  deregulation  may  be an effective  remedy  in  many  countries,
it is an oversimplification  to  assume  that  this  approach  by itself  will
quicken  the  pace of PSD.  It is  possible  that  some  segments  of the  private
sector  are  so  undeveloped  that  information  and advice  on market
opportunities  and  assistance  in terms  of capital  and  infrastructure  may
have to  be provided  to encourage  entrepreneurship  and  new investment. In
countries  with relatively  more  developed  private  sectors,  the  need  may  be
for  closer  collaboration  and  trust  between  the  private  sector  and
government.
Given  the  variations  in the  levels  of development  of LDCs,  it  is
appropriate  to  present  a "menu"  of approaches  to  PSD  from  which  a
government  could  choose  a mix that  fits  its  special  needs. Four  approaches
are  proposed  below:
- The  deregulatorv  aRproach  is  a response  to the  excessive
controls  which  constrain  the  private  sector. The elimination- 77 -
of unnecessary  laws  and  regulations,  simplification  of those
that  must  remain,  and  the  rationalization  of the  procedures
for  their  implementation  are important  dimensions  of this
approach. The  assumption  here is that  excessive  or
inappropriate  laws,  regulations  and  procedures  are  the
primary  barriers  to PSD.
- The  prometional  aDRroach  is  designed  to  encourage  PSD  through
the  provision  of information  and  advisory  services. These
services  act  as an incentive  to entrepreneurs,  both  local  and
foreign,  especially  in  the  early  stages  of their  ventures  and
may  cover  the  entire  gamut  of  marketing,  finance,  technology
and trade.
- The  develogmental  agDroach  focusses  on assistance  to  PSD
through  the  creation  of the  infrastructure  that  private
entrepreneurs  require. The  resource  requirements  of this
approach  will  be substantially  larger  than  those  of the
deregulatory  and  promotional  approaches  listed  above.
- The  partnershiR  apgroach  highlights  collaboration  and  mutual
trust  between  the  private  sector  and  government.  This
approach  is  particularly  relevant  to countries  whose  private
sectors  are  reasonably  well  developed  and  the  potential  for
deregulation  has  been  substantially  realized. The
partnership  approach  is  designed  to further  improve  private
sector  performance  through  mutual  consultation  and
institutional  mechanisms  which  foster  joint  decision  making
and  collaboration  action.
These  four  approaches  should  not  be treated  as mutually  exclusive.
Rather,  they  focus  on the  thrust  and  the  varying  mix  of elements  that  PSD
requires  under  difievent  conditions.  Thus some  governments,  for  example,
may adopt  a deregulatory  approach  to PSD  along  with  a limited  emphasis  on
developmental  and  partnership  roles. Others,  however,  may  opt  for  a
promotional  approach  in  view  of the  infancy  of their  private  sectors. The
progression  in terms  of approaches  is linked  to  the  levels  of development
of countries  and  the  maturity  of their  governments  and  private  sectors.
IV.  Private  Sector  Assessment:  A Framework
It is  within  this  perspective  that  the  scope  and  methodology  of
private  sector  assessment  should  be examined. The  objectives  of the
assessment  which  is a form  of sector  work  are  threefold: (1)  to  provide  an
overview  of the  nature  and  scope  of the  private  sector  in the  selected
country,  as a  basis  for  choosing  priority  areas  or issues  for  detailed
diagnosis;  (2)  to identify  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of the  totality  or
selected  segments  of the  private  sector  depending  on the  outcome  of (1)
above;  and (3)  to  suggest  the  directions  for  change  and  possible  approaches- 78 -
to strengthening  PSD  in light  of the  foregoing  diagnosis. If these
objectives  are  met,  the  exercise  may  contribute  to the  process  of  country
strategy  formulation  and  help identify  Bank  activities  for  PSD.  Such
activities  may include  policy  dialogue  with governments,  technical
assistance  for  PSD  and  policy-based  lending  operations  in support  of PSD.
For  example,  governments  may  require  technical  assistance  to  promote
private  investment  or strengthen  certain  public  institutions  in the  wake of
regulatory  reform. The  exercise  should  supplement  and  build  on the  ongoing
country  economic  and  sector  work  drawing  upon  the  different  components  and
phases  discussed  below.
A full  scale  private  sector  assessment  exercise  in  an LDC  may
consist  of the following  five  components:
(1)  An overview  of the  nature  and  scope  of the  country's  private
sector. It is  essential  to  have a  broad  understanding  of the
relative  importance  and  key features  of a country's  private
sector  before  a detailed  assessment  of its  various  dimensions
is attempted. This  overview  may draw  upon  data  on the
following:
a.  Share  of the  private  sector  in the  country's  output,
employment  and investment;
b.  Shares  of large  scale  and  small  scale  and informal
activities  by sector,  gender  or region,  as appropriate;
c.  Indigenous  vs foreign  ownership  by sector;
d.  Relative  importance  of different  types  of organizations
(corporations,  cooperatives,  NGOs,  family  enterprises,
etc.);
e.  Measures  of  competition  in  different  segments  of the
private  sector;  extent  of  monetizationin  the  economy;
f.  Major  gaps  in the  infrastructure  facilities  available  to
the  private  sector;  and
g.  Performance  and  problems  of the  different  segments  of
the  private  sector.
If data  are  readily  available,  it should  be easy  to attempt  a
rapid  assessment  of the  nature  and  scope  of a country's  private
sector  as  part  of an economic  mission  and  in  a fairly  short  period
(8-12  weeks). On some  of the  indicators  listed  above  such  as
extent  of competition,  inferences  may  have to  be made  based  on the
data  on  market  concentration  or the  degree  of protection  enjoyed
by the  sectors  involved. If documentation  is  a problem,  the- 79 -
endeavor  should  be to  build  up as  much evidence  on these
dimensions  as  possible  through  interviews  so as to  get  a rough  and
ready  assessment  of the  state  of the  private  sector  and  its
problems. This is  a useful  first  step  towards  understanding  the
strengths  and  weaknesses  of a country's  private  sector. It is in
light  of this  first  cut that  a decision  should  be made  on the
sectors  to  be selected  for  in-depth  assessment.  A preliminary
analysis  may  indicate  that  the  key sector  to study  further  is
industry,  the  operating  legal  system  or the  informal  sector. It
is possible  that  some  sectors  are  more ready  for  development  or
assigned  greater  priority  than  others. A comprehensive  assessment
of the  entire  private  sector  will then  be phased  over  time.
Alternatively,  it  might  be appropriate  to  go for  a detailed
assessment  of the  economy  (especially  for  small  countries)  as a
whole.  The  time  and  resource  requirements  of the  exercise  will
vary depending  on the  scope  of the  assessment.
(2)  A review  of the  Rolicies.  laws  and  regulations  affecting  the
sector(s)  selected  for  assessment. First  of all,  it is important
to find  out  whether  there  are  declared  policies  which  specify  or
limit  the  role  of the  private  sector  in  different  areas  of
activity  and  lay  down  directions  for  private  sector  operations.
Laws and  regulations  are  usually  enacted  in  furtherance  of such
policies. The  major  areas  for  assessment  here  are  of  policies,
laws  and  regulations  affecting  investment,  ownership,  output,
pricing,  distribution,  access  to technology,  information  and  other
inputs  (domestic  and  foreign),  financing,  taxation  and  employment,
and their  actual  vs.  nominal  impact  on the  private  sector.
Clearly,  this  is a  vast  area  which  needs  to  be assessed
selectively  in order  to identify  the  key constraints  in the  policy
environment. It is  possible  that  review;i  of these  problems  are
readily  available  in some  countries. If so,  the  endeavor  should
be to sharpen  the  assessment  through  interactions  with  clients
(private  sector),  local  consultants  and  implementors  (civil
servants). The  questions  to  explore  in  this  area  are the
following:
a.  Of the  policies,  laws  and  regulations  affecting  the
private  segment  of the  selected  sector(s),  which  pose
the  most  severe  constraints? To  what extent  can the
growth  of the  informal  (underground)  sector,  if  any,  be
attributed  to  these  policies  and  regulations?
b.  Which  among  the  policies,  laws  and  regulations  are  the
most institutionally  intensive?
c.  Has the  government  attempted  a systematic  review  of
these  policies,  laws  and  regulations?  If yes,  what
actions  have  been taken  by the  government?  What  has
been the  impact  on the  private  sector?- 80  -
d.  If no action  has  been taken,  what  are the  views  of
private  entrepreneurs  and  civil  servants  on  what the  key
problems  are  and  what the  priorities  should  be for
reform?
e.  Which  are  the  major  interest  groups  for  and  against
reform  in this  area? What  are  their  strengths,
weaknesses  and  capacity  to induce  or  block  change?
(3)  A review  of the  common  service  institutions  of the  private
sector. The  range  of such  institutions  (representative,
policy  advisory,  professional,  etc.),  the  client  feedback  on
their  services,  and  resources  required  to strengthen  them  are
the  main areas  to  be investigated.  In general,  they  are  more
open  institutions  and  hence  easier  to assess. The  assessment
will  have to  be done  primarily  through  interviews  with
important  private  sector  actors. Since  there  is  _ Rriori
evidence  that  this  is  a weak  area in  many  LDCs,  special
attention  has to  be given  to  the identification  of gaps  and
the  priorities  to  be established  to  remedy  them.  Here again,
the  issues  and  types  of institutional  needs  will  vary
depending  on the  sectors  being  assessed. Some  of the  issues
to  be probed  further  are  the  following:
a.  What  are  the  different  types  of institutions  which  the.
private  sector  has set  up to  meet its  common  needs?
b.  In  which  areas  are  these  institutions  the  weakest  in
serving  the  private  sector?
c.  What  are the  major  constraints  on their  capacity  to
service  the  private  sector?
d.  What  are  the  areas  in  which  no private  sector  service
institution  exists? Are  these  areas  regarded  as serious
gaps  by the  private  sector?
e.  Will the  private  sector  be able  to fill  these  gaps  on
its  own?  How  should  the  government  assist  in  this
effort?
(4) An assessment  of the  calacitX  of the  gublic  institutions
resoonsible  for  Rlanning  and imRlementing  the  laws  and
regulations  referred  to in (2)  above. Here  again,  it  will  be
best to examine  these  institutions  (which  regulate  or assist
the  private  sector  and/or  purchase  goods  and  services  from
private  suppliers)  after  a review  has determined  the  tasks  or
functions  they  are  supposed  to  perform. For  example,
deregulation  may  cause  a deletion  of some  of their  functions,
and  addition  of others.  It is also  possible  that  policy  and
regulatory  reforms  have  brought  about  a  reduction  in  their- 81  -
institutional  intensity  thus  preparing  the  ground  better  for
public  institutions  to  cope  with their  tasks.  An assessment
of their  needs  in terms  of  capacity  building  or reorientation
must therefore  take  into  account  their  changed  or redefined
roles  and  functions. The following  questions  are  pertinent
to  this  component:
a.  What  are  the  regulatory  institutions  which  have the  most
adverse  effect  on PSD? Will  policy  reforms  with reduced
institutional  intensity  eliminate  these  adverse  effects?
b.  In light  of the  private  sector  feedback,  what are  the
problem  areas  (roles  and  functions,  structure,  access,
procedures  etc.)  in these  institutions?  Which  are  most
in  need  of  reform?
c.  What  are  the  major  public  institutions  providing  support
services  of  different  types  to  the  private  sector?
Which  agencies  buy goods  and  services  from  the  private
sector?
d.  What  is the  private  sector's  feedback  on their  services,
accessibility,  responsiveness  to clients? Do the
contracting  agencies  pay the  private  suppliers  promptly?
What are  the  major  constraints  on their  capacity  to
serve  the  private  sector?
e.  Has the  private  sector  or government  identified  the
directions  for  restructuring  both types  of the
institutions?
(5) An assessment  of the  overatin&  legal  system  and  oractices
affectin&  the  private  sector. Elements  here  will include
property  rights,  contractual  rights,  law  of associations,
criminal  law,  labor  laws,  cost  and  delays  in legal  redress,
etc.  In some  LDCs,  for  instance,  there  may  be elements  of
the  legal  system  which  inhibit  and  constrain  private
initiatives.  Property  rights  with respect  to land  or other
assets  are  an example. Farmers  may  not  have the  incentive  to
cultivate  or invest  in  new assets  when there  is  no assurance
that  they  will  receive  the  rewards  both in  the  short  and  long
run.  In  other  cases,  gaps  in the  operating  legal  system  may
be a  handicap  to  private  entrepreneurs.  If there  is  no
contract  law  or it is  faulty,  for  example,  enforcement  of
contracts  will  be a probiem. Entrepreneurs  will  be reluctant
to invest  or  undertake  risks  under  these  circumstances.
Issues  to  be probed  in this  area  are  the  following:
a.  What  aspects  of the  operating  legal  system  of the
country  cause  the  most  difficulties  for  private  sector
operations?  Do they  adversely  affect  some  sectors  of82  -
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activity  more  than  others  (e.g.,  legal  barriers  which
inhibit  the  mobilization  of savings,  enforcement  of
contracts,  informal  and  small  scale  sector  activities,
financial  intermediation)?
b.  Do they  hinder  some  private  sector  segments  more than
others  (e.g.,  foreign  vs. indigenous,  men  vs.  women)?
c.  Of the  identified  problem  areas,  which  are  the  most
amenable  to change?
d.  Who are  the  major  actors  to  be mobilized  to initiate
reform?
e.  In the  more difficult  problem  areas,  what action  should
be taken  now to  prepare  the  ground  for  change
eventually? If that  is  difficult,  what other  options
are  available  to  compensate  for  these  handicaps?
V.  Planning  for  Private  Sector  Assessment
There  is  no doubt  that  many  of the  questions  posed  above  are  being
explored  today  in some  form  or another  as  part of the  ongoing  country
economic  and  sector  work of the  regions. What the  foregoing  framework  does
is to  treat  them  more  systematically  and  integrate  them  under  a set  of
components  which  are  closely  linked  to  each  other. It is  possible,  for
example,  that  the  policies  and  regulations  affecting  PSD  in  a country  have
been  examined,  but the  implications  of the  proposed  reforms  for  the  public
institutions  implementing  them  have  not  been analyzed. In  other  cases,
policies  and  public  Xnstitutional  issues  may  have  been  assessed,  but the
basic  gaps  in the  legal  framework  wnich  inhibit  private  entrepreneurs  may
have  been ignored. Thus the  synergy  that  a systematic  assessment  of these
components  and  their  linkages  would  have  bestowed  on the  strategy
formulation  process  for  PSD  remains  underutilized  in the  absence  of the
framework  outlined  above. As explained  below,  this  does  not imply  that
Bank  activities  in a country  should  cover  all  components  simultaneously.
Rather,  the  focus  is  on the  use  of the  framework  in  planning  a coherent
country  strategy  for  PSD  with the  clear  understanding  that  Bank activities
for  PSD  will  be sequenced  to suit  the  specific  country  context.
The  methodology  for  private  sector  assessment  may incorporate  and
synthesize  all five  components  described  above  or only  a subset  of them
depending  on the  country  context  and  the  priority  to  be given  to PSD  in the
country  strategy. The first  three  components,  for  example,  could  be
completed  more  quickly  than  the  last  two.  In  countries  which  require
action  on PSD in  the  short  term,  it  may  be advisable  to  begin  the
assessment  with the  first  tiaree  components  and  limited  segments  of the
others. It is  possible  to  make  an impact  in the  short  or medium  term  by
reforming  laws  and  regulations  or improving  private  sector  common  service
institutions.  Effecting  changes  in the  operating  legal  system  of a country- 83 -
or reforming  its  public  sector  institutions,  on the  other  hand,  tend  to  be
long  drawn  out  tasks.  This is  because  policy  reforms  are  generally  easier
to achieve  than  institutional  changes,  especially  in the  public  sector.
Among  institutions,  private  institutions  are  likely  to  be more responsive
to  the  call  for  reform  than  their  public  counterparts  given  the  greater
autonomy  and  incentives  enjoyed  by the  former. If,  however,  long-term
impact  through  PSD  is the  objective,  it is imperative  that  the  long-term
components  (the  last  two)  are  also  adequately  dealt  with as  part of an
ongoing  assessment  exercise.
Since  private  sector  assessment  as discussed  above  is  a new
concept  and  yet  to be tested  in the  field,  it is important  that  it first
goes through  a pilot  phase  before  being  replicated  in  a  variety  of country
contexts. Countries  selected  for  the  pilot  phase  should  have  a strong
interest  in the  exercise  and  be supported  by Bank  country  departments
committed  to the  incorporation  of PSD  into  their  country  strategies.  The
sequence  of steps  to  be followed  in the  exercise  are  the  following:
a.  Selection  of  countries  for  the  pilot  phase,  and further
development  of the  components  of the  exercise.
b.  Completion  of the  overview  component.
c.  Selection  of one  or more  sectors  for  detailed  assessment.
d.  Field  assessment.
e.  Review  of findings.
f.  Identification  of the  directions  for  reform/action.
g.  Internal  (Bank)  discussions  on the  outcome  of the  exercise.
h.  Discussions  of outcome  with governments  (if  considered
appropriate).
i.  Development  of a PSD  strategy  component  as iart  of the
country  strategy  and  determination  of  priorities  for  Bank
activities.- 84  -
ANNEX  II
Ghana's  Private  Sector: A Disasgregated  Analysis
There  is an overall  paucity  of reliable  data  on the  private
sector's  operations,  performance  and  problems  in  Ghana. Thus,  there  is
hardly  any  data  on the  investment,  growth  and  other  dimensions  of the
private  sector  as a  whole  or of its  sub-sectors.  Data  on performance
indicators  such  as costs  and  profitability  are  scanty. Limitations  of data
thus  make it  exceedingly  difficult  to  provide  an overview  of Ghana's
private  sector  against  a  historical  perspective  and to  disaggregate  the
performance  and  prospects  of the  sub-sectors  of private  sector  activity
with  any  reasonable  measure  of accuracy. The  account  of the  private  sector
presented  below is  therefore  incomplete  in  many  respects  and  focuses  on the
broad  categories  of  private  sector  activity  for  which  data  were available
for  some  recent  period. These  include  agriculture,  industry
(manufacturing,  mining,  construction  and  utilities),  wholesale  and  retail
trade,  transport  and  communications,  finance,  health  and  education.
1.  Agriculture
Agricultural  production  in  Ghana  consists  of cash  and  food  crops,
livestock  and  poultry,  timber  and  forestry,  and  fishing. Crop  production
is  dominated  by the  cocoa  subsector  with its  numerous  smallholder  farmers.
Estate  production  is limited  to oil  palm  and  rubber. Over three  million- 85  -
self-employed  persons  accounting  for  95  percent  of the  agricultural  labor
force  were engaged  in  crop,  livestock  and  poultry  production  in  1984.
Forestry  and fishing  were also  dominated  by the  private  sector. Of the  86
establishments  in  forestry,  all  but four  were  private;  of the  60 fishery
enterprises,  all  but  one  were  privately  owned.  In  addition,  the informal
fishing  sub-sector  employed  nearly  50,000  persons  in 1984.
Though  small  farmers  and  self-employed  persons  dominate
agriculture,  they  function  not only  as individuals  but  also in  many -ases
through  cooperatives.  In 1985,  4,476  agriculture-related  cooperatives
existed  in  Ghana  (See  Table  1).
Table  1
AGRICULTURAL  COOPERATIVE  SOCIETIES  (1985)
Type  of  :No. of  Type  of  :No. of
Coogerative  Societies  Cooperative  Societies
:Multi-purpose  :  187  :Mixed  farming  15
:Food  farming  :  1729  :Livestock/food  11
farming
:Fishing  474  :Cola  nut producers  13
:Maize  growers  :  60  :Cereal  farming  24
:Poultry  farmers  96  :Livestock  farming  9
:Collective  farming  176  :Pig  farmers  23
:Produce  marketing  102  :Sheanut  farming  23
:Fish  mongers  . 840  :Tobacco  growers  14
:Sugarcane  growers  :  42  :Cocoa  producers  30
:Rice  farmers  :  84  :Rubbfer  farming  14
:Vegetable  growers  40  :Giriger  growers  18
:Oil  palm  growers  :  37  :Others  262
:Agricultural  Societies  15  :Total  4476
In  brief,  Ghana's  agriculture  is  virtually  in the  hands  of the
private  sector  though  GOG  owns  some  plantations. It is reasonable  to
conclude  that  the  bulk  of the  investment  in  this  activity  is  also  by the- 86  -
private  sector. The  Government's  role  in  agriculture  is  primarily  the
provision  of extension,  research  and  marketing;  thus  state  agencies  such  as
the  Departments  of Crop  Protection  and  Quarantine,  Fisheries,  and  Animal
Health  and  Production,  Cocoa  Board,  Cocoa  Research  Institute,  Soil  Research
Institute,  Crop  Research  Institute,  Institute  of Acquatic  Biology,  and
Water  Resources  Research  Institute  are  expected  to  provide  these  and  other
services  to farmers  and  the  agricultural  sectoS  in  general.
2.  Industry
The industry  sector  which  accounted  for  13.4  percent  of  GDP in
1986  consists  of the  subsectors  of  manufacturing,  mining  and  quarrying,
construction,  electricity,  water  and  gas. Of these,  the  largest  subsector
is the  manufacturing  subsector  (9  percent  GDP).  The  roles  of the  private
and  public  sectors  in  manufacturing  and  mining  have  varied  over  time  in
Ghana. In general,  GOG  has  dominated  the  relatively  heavier  industries
whereas  most  of the  private  sector  consists  of the  medium  and  small  scale
industries.  The  distribution  of the  registered  industrial  establishments
in che  country  in 1987  and their  ownership  structure  are  given  in  Table  2.
While  the  number  of  private  establishments  is  clearly  by far  the  larger  in
all  subsectors  except  mining  and  utilities,  data limitations  make it
difficult  to judge  their  relative  importance  in terms  of output  and
investment. The  informal  sector  is  active  in  all  subsectors  except
utilities. If informal  production  is added,  the  private  sector  certainly
dominates  industry  in terms  of employment.- 87 -
TABLE 2
REGISTERED  INDUSTRIAL  ESTABLIEHMENTS AND
THEIR  OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
AS OF 1987
1987
Number  of  Privately  :  Wholly  :Joint-State
Industry  Tvpe  Establishments  Owned  State  Owned  Private
Manufacturing  1,016  921  54  :  41
Mining  8  :  1  5  :  2
Quarrying  10  :  8  2
Construction  1,911  :1,905  5  1
Electricity,
Gas  & Water  :  5  :  4
TOTAL  2,950  2,835  70  44
100%  96%  2.4%  1.6%
Sources:  Association  of Ghana  Industries.
SOE  Task Force  Report  on State  Enterprise  Reform,  June  1986
Ministry  of  Lands  and  Natural  Resources  and
Ministry  of  Works  and  Housing
Ministry  of  Works  and  Housing  and  Ministry  of Roads  and  Highways
Ministry  of Fuel  and  Power  and  Ministry  of
Works  and  Housing.
(a)  The  Manufacturing  Subsector
The growth  of manufacturing  output  in  Ghana  reached  its  peak rate
of 14  percent  per  annum  in  the  mid-1970s  and  then  declined  steadily  to
about  sevel  percent  by 1985. The  private  sector  share  of  manufacturing
output  is currently estimated  at 75 percent. Nearly  half  of manufacturing
output  comes  from  the  following  six  industries:- 88 -
1.  Processing  of agricultural  and  food  materials
2.  Wood-based  products
3.  Energy-related  products
4.  Non-metallic  products
5.  Textile  products
6.  Basic  metal  processing.
Of the  1,016  registered  manufacturing  establishments,  420  are  estimated  to
be large  and  medium  scale  units  and the  remainder  small  scale  units. Sixty
percent  of  the  enterprises  are  registered  as  limited  liability  companies
while  40  percent  are  sole  proprietorships.  The  informal  sector  in
manufacturing  is  large  in  terms  of  employment  with  nearly  a  half  million
persons  reported  to  be  engaged  in  this  activity;  however,  its  output  is
estimated  at 20  percent  of  total  manufacturing  output.  A  1984  survey  of
small  scale  industries  showed  that  the  largest  number  of  units  were in
agro-based  industries  and  in textiles  and  leather. 1 Repairs  were the  next
most  popular  subsector. For  starting  new  enterprises,  only  seven  percent
of those  surveyed  obtained  bank financing;  nearly  88  percent  depended  on
families  and  friends  for  the  initial  capital. For  existing  small
enterprises,  banks  provided  nearly  50 percent  of the  credit. A majority  of
entrepreneurs  (61  percent)  identified  credit  as their  single  most important
problem. Problems  such  as lack  of skilled  manpower  and  low  demand  were
perceived  to  be minor  issues  compared  to  the  credit  pioblem.
1/  Thomi  and  Yankson,  Small  Scale  Industries  and  Decentralization  in  Ghana,
Accra,  1985.- 89 -
Capacity  utilization  has  been  a persistent  problem  in the  modern
manufacturing  sector. The  average  utilization  rate  was in the  43-52
percent  range  during  1970-77,  but fell  to  21 percent  by 1982. With the
improved  supply  of raw  materials  and  electric  power  in 1983-86,  capacity
utilization  has  picked  up again  and  is currently  around  50  percent. No
Information  is  available  on  capacity  utilization  in the  small  scale
industry  sector.
Private  Investment
Trends  in investment  are  an important  indicator  of the  health  and
vigor  of the  private  sector  in a  country. As noted  above,  there  is  no
systematic  information  on private  sector  investment  in Ghana. The  Ghana
Investments  Centre  (GIC),  however,  is  an important  repository  of data  on
that major  segment  of the  private  sector  which  is  entitled  to the  benefits
specified  in  the  Investment  Code  of 1985. The  GIC  data  does  not  cover  the
investment  in  the  mining  and  minerals  sectors,  agriculture  (except  large
scale,  commercial)  and  small  enterprises.  GIC  maintains  data  on investment
proposals  received  and  proposals  approved  classified  by industry.
Unfortunately,  GIC  has only  just  begun  its  monitoring  activities  and
therefore  has  no useful  data  available  on the  implementation  of the
approved  projects.
GIC  data,  however,  could  be regarded  as a  partial  index  of private
investment  intentions.  In 1986,  GIC received  a total  of 163  invxstment-90-
proposals  with  a total  cost  of 049.9 billion  (at  current  prices). 2 Of
these,  154  proposals  were  approved  with  a total  cost  of 033.8  billion. In
1987,  GIC  received  177  proposals  with  a total  cost  of 037.4  billion. The
total  cost  of the  146  projects  approved  in 1987  was g31.7  billion  after
adjusting  for  changes  in the  exchange  rate  and inflation.  During  the  first
half  of 1988,  GIC  has received  70  proposals.
There  is  a significant  decline  in  terms  of-private  investment
intentions  between  1986  and  1987.3  The  total  cost  of planned  projects  in
real  terms  fell  by 25  percent  and  that  of approved  projects  by 6.3  percent
during  this  period. The  backlog  of  project  proposals  has  declined  from
016.1  billion  at th2  end  of 1986  to  g5.7  billion  at the  end  of 1987. The
number  of  proposals  received  by GIC  in the  first  half  of 1988  has fallen  by
20  percent  compared  to the  trend  in  1987. The  reasons  for  this  decline  are
not  clear  at this  stage  though  there  is  speculation  that  the  credit
constraints  (cedi  resources)  imposed  by the  banking  system  have contributed
to it.  There  have  been some  changes  in  the  composition  of planned
investments  too.  In 1986,  the  subsectors  which  led  in terms  of the  volume
of investment  were  projects  related  to agriculture,  food  and  food  products,
wood  and  wood  products  and  tourism. In 1987,  wood  and  wood  products,
agriculture,  metal  and  metal  products  and  rubber  and  plastics  ranked  above
all  others.
2/ Cedi (g),  the  Ghana  currency  was  devalued  several  times  since  1983. The
exchange  rates  in  1986  and  1987  were  90  cedis  and  150  cedis  per  US
Dollar  respectively.  By  July  1988,  the  rate  had depreciated  to  211
cedis  per dollar.
J The  data  referred  to  here  were  furnished  to che  author  by the  GIC.91  -
Competition
It is  difficalt  to  judge  the  degree  of competition  in the
manufacturing  sector. Some  products  such  as cement  and  evaporated  milk  are
characterized  by monopoly. On the  other  hand,  textiles,  leather  goods,
plastics  and food  and  beverages  are  produced  by several  firms  and  hence
face  a fair  measure  of market  competition. Irrespective  of the  .-imber  of
domestic  producers,  foreign  exchange  auctions  and imports  liberalization
have  had the  effect  of increasing  the  competition  in the  market  place.
The  extent  of competition  may also  be limited  by government
policies  which  discriminate  in  favor  of public  sector  enterprises.
Government's  procurement  policies,  for  instance,  may  require  that
preference  should  be given  to  public  enterprises  in the  purchr  n  of goods
and  services  required  by ministries  and  other  public  agencies. Similarly,
public  enterprises  are  reported  to  have  been  asked  to  buy goods  and
services  from  each  other  rather  than  from  the  open  market  thus  excluding
the  private  sector. Systematic  information  on this  subject  does  not exist
in  Ghana. It is reported,  however,  that  current  GOG  procurement  policies
do give  preference  to  public  enterprises  in  the  matter  of purchases. On
the  other  hand,  there  is some  evidence  to  show  that  these  policies  are in
fact  not  being  enforced. To the  extent  such  restrictive  policies  are
enforced,  opportunities  for  the  private  sector  to  compete  in  the  market
will  undoubtedly  decrease. 4
§/ The  Bank  has recently  proposed  that  a study  of GOG  procurement  policies
be undertaken.- 92  -
(b) Mining  and  Ouarrying
Mining  in  Ghana  dates  back to the  1920s. There  are  eight  mining
companies  of  which  five  are in  gold  mining  and  one  each  in  diamond,  bauxite
and  managenese  mining. Private  foreign  investors  were  responsible  for  the
development  of  mining  in  Ghana. But their  role  declined  significantly  by
1980  when GOG  nationalized  most  of these  companies. Two  mining  companies
(one  gold  and  one  bauxite)  are  currently  owned  jointly  by GOG  and  private
foreign  investors.  A third  public  sector  company  is  operated  under  foreign
management. Though  there  is  no  private  Ghanaian  participation  in the
formal  mining  subsector,  over  a thousand  self  employed  Ghanaians  are
engaged  in  informal  diamond  mining.
The  mining  sector  is  the  second  largest  foreign  exchange  earner
after  cocoa,  accounting  for  25  percent  of  Ghana's  export  earnings. Though
mining  output  had declined  since  1975,  its  share  of GDP  was 1.1  percent  in
1986  and  its  rate  of growth  since  1983  has averaged  around  10  percent.
Extensive  rehabilitation  and  modernization  and  improved  incentives  through
devaluation  are the  primary  factors  responsible  for  the  recovery.
(c)  Construction
The  construction  subsector  consists  of civil  construction  and
electrical  engineering  and  plumbing  works. There  are  presently  1 911
registered  civil,  electrical  and  building  construction  firms  in Ghana. In
terms  of numbers,  this  subsector  is  virtually  controlled  by private93 -
entrepreneurs  (99.8  percent). Their  share  of  output,  however,  is only  50
percent. In addition,  there  are  23,000  self  employed  contractors  operating
in  the  informal  construction  subsector. Of the  1,911  registered  firms,  one
third  are  limited  liability  companies  and  two  thirds  are  sole
proprietorships.
Some  of the  public  construction  including  maintenance  is  done
through  the  Ghana  Construction  Corporation  and  other  public  infrastructure
agencies. Most  of them  have  in-house  facilities  for  maintenance.  When  new
construction  is  limited,  maintenance  is  the  dominant  activity. This  may
explain  the  rather  low  share  of the  private  sector  in  construction  output.
*£ABLE  3
RCEISTERED  CIVIL.  ELECTRICAL.
BUILDING  AND  PLUMBING  CONTRACTORS  (1988)
:  Type  of  Business  :
Category  of  Organization  :Type  of  Ownership  Nationality
Business  :Total  :  Sole  :  Joint
:No.  of :Company  :Proprie-  :State :State/  :Private:Ghana:For-:
:Firms  :torship :Owned :Private:Sector  :ian  :eign:Mixed
Building
Construction :  :  :  :  :
Firms  1425  410  :  1015  3  1422  1424:
Electrical  :
Constructica :  :  :
Firms  :256:  64  192  :  :256:
Plumbing  :  :
Firms  33:  11  :  22  :  33:  33:
Road
Construction :  :  :  :  :
Firms  :  197  :  154  :  43  :  1  :  :  196  :  192:4  :
Total  :  1911  :  639  :  1272  :  4  :  :  1907  :  1905:  4  :  2
Percentage  :  100.0  :  33.0  :  67.0  :  0.2  :  :  99.8  :  99.7:0.2  :  0.1
Sources:  Ministry  of  Works  and  Housing
Ministry  of Roads  and  Highways
Architectural  & Engineering  Services  Corporation  (AESC)-- 94-
(d) Utilities
Utility  industries  are  dominated  by the  public  sector. The  Volta
River  Authority  and  the  Ghana  Electricity  Corporation,  both  owned  by  GOG,
are  responsible  for  electricity  generation  and  distribution  in  the  country.
Another  public  enterprise,  Ghana  Water  and  Sewerage  Corporation,  is
responsible  for  most  of the  water  supply. Two  other  public  enterprises,  of
which  one  is a  joint  public-private  venture,  meet  the  gas  requirements  of
the  country. These  capital  intensive  enterprises  operate  under  monopoly
conditions  but are  regulated  by GOG.  Private  sector  participation  in  this
subsector  is  negligible.  A modest  role is  played  by rural  communities  in
the  provision  of drinking  water. A few  private  companies  produce  power
through  the.use  of diesel  generators.  These,  however,  are  too
insignifica-  to  make  any  dent  on the  monopolistic  utility  industries.
3.  Wholesale  and  Retail  Trade
This  sector  is the  third  largest  contributor  to Ghana's  GDP  and
the  second  largest  employer. The  private  sector's  share  of  GDP in trade
was 95  percent  in  1986  and its  share  of  employment  was  97  percent. There
are  644  trading  enterprises  registered  with  the  Ghana  Chamber  of Commerce.
In addition,  there  are  an estimated  691,000  self  employed  persons  also
engaged  in commerce. Apart  from  the  trading  enterprises  which  conduct
wholesale  and  retail  trading,  most  of the  manufacturers  are  also  engaged  in
wholesale  trade. Private  foreign  participation  in trading  is  also  reported- 95 -
to  be significant,  though  lack  of  data  precludes  a quantitative  assessment
of its  scope  and  relative  importance.
4.  The Financial  Sector
Financial  intermediation  in  the  economy  is provided  by a  number  of
bank  and  non-bank  financial  institutions  which  make  up the  financial
system. In addition,  there  are  a large  number  of  private  money  lenders
operating  in  the  rural  and  urban  areas  in the  informal  financial  sector.
The financial  system  of the  country  is still  in  an early  stage  of
development.  The financial  institutions  are  virtually  all  owned  by GOG.
There  is only  one  private  bank and  five  other  commercial  banks  which  are
jointly  owned  by the  private  sector  and  GOG (See  Table  4).
The  small  rural  banks  are  also  jointly  owned  by the  private  and
public  sectors. Of the  ten  insurance  companies,  six  are  owned  by the
private  sector. However,  two  public  sector  insurance  companies  alone
account  for  over  50  percent  of the  total  business. It is  estimated  that  of
the  five  percent  GDP  share  of the  financial  sector,  the  contribution  of the
private  sector  institutions  is  20  percent.
5.  Transport  and  Communications
The transport  subsector  in  Ghana  consists  of the  four  principal
modes  of transportation,  namely,  road,  rail,  air  and  water. Of these,  road
transport  alone  accounts  for  94  percent  of the  national  freight  traffic  and
97  percent  of the  total  passenger  miles.- 96 -
TABIL  4
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY  BANKS AND THEIR  OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE (1988)
Name  :  No.  of :  Wholly  :Private:Joint  State/
:Branches:State-Owned:  :  Private
Ghana  Commercial  Bank  152  X
Barclays  Bank  29  X
Standard  Bank  24  X
Social  Security  Bank  52  X
Bank for Housing &  :  :
Construction  10  X
National  Investment  Bank  10  X
National Savings &  :  :
Credit  Bank  18  X
Agriculture  Development  Bank  :  34  X
Merchant  Bank (GH)  Ltd.  3  X
Cooperative  Bank  Ltd.  50  X
Bank for  Credit  and  Commerce  X
Rural  Banks  :  lCl  X
TOTAL  : 483  :  5  :  1  106
Source: Research  Department,  Bank  of Ghana.- 97 -
While rail,  air and  water transport  are  monopolized  by GOG,  nearly
90 percent  of road  transport  is in the  hands  of the  private  sector, Except
for three  state  owned  road transport  companies,  all other  vehicle  operators
are small  scale  entrepreneurs  who own  4-5  vehicles  each.  Entry  into  the
road transport  business  is  virtu.lly  free.  Competition  in  this subsector
is,  therefore,  quite  strong  and  me e so in intra  urban transport  than  in
inter  urban and  rural  transport.
The  vehicular  utilization  in the  private  sector  is reported  to be
signifincantly  higher  than  in the  public  sector  though  the  latter  has a more
modern  fleet. Road transport  services  are  concentrated  in the  southern
half of the  country  where the  road  conditions  are comparatively  better.
GOG is  the  main  investor  in  the  communications  subsector.  The
state-owned  Posts  and  Telecommunications  Corporation  is  a monopoly. There
is,  however,  a modest  role for  the  private  sector  in the  operation  of the
courier  and telex  services  in  which  a few  foreign  and  Ghanaian  companies
are  active. The  private  sector's  participation  in transport  and
communications  can  be  increased  only  through  the  divestiture  of  the
state-owned  corporations  and the  contracting  out  of some  of their
activities  if  divestiture  is  ruled  out.
6.  Health
GOG is the  largest  provider  of health  services  in the  country.
The  state-owned  facilities  include  two teaching  hospitals,  eight  district- 98 -
J  .
hospitals  and  139  clinics,  11 specialist  hospitals,  15  urban  health  centers
and  25 rural  health  stations. Together,  these  facilities  accounit  for  70
percent  of all  health  services. The  private  sector  which  accounts  for  30
percent  of  health  services  delivery  owns  35  mission  hospitals,  34  mission
,  *
clinics,  and  101  clinics  run  by private  industrialists  and  medical
practitioners.  The  private  sector's  share  of  employment  in  the  health
sector  was 35  percent  in  1984. There  are  965  registered  doctors  and
dentists  in  Ghana  of  whom 31  percent  are  private  practitioners.  In
addition,  there  are  numerous  traditional  medical  practitioners  whose  number
is  unknown. The  practice  of modern  medicine  is  confined  largely  to the
urban  areas  of the  country.
7.  Educatio
Ghana  has a literacy  rate  in  excess  of 50  percent. Its  skilled
manpower  accounts  for  nearly  a third  of the  economically  active  population.
Ghana  has  a three-tier  system  of education  consisting  of primary  schools
and  junjor  secondary  schools  (Tier  1),  secondary,  technical  and  vocational
schocls  (Tier  2) and  universities  and  specialized  research  and  training
centers  (Tier  3).  Of the  nearly  14,000  educational  institutions,  GOG  owned
95 percent  in 1988. Private  sector  participation  in  education  accounts  for
only five  percent  of the  total  and  is  confined  to tiers  1 and  2.  Its  role
is  dominant  in the  technical  and  vocational  category  with  74  percent  of the
108  schools  being  operated  privately. The  private  sector  used  to  play  a
notable  role in  primary  education  too,  but this  has  declined  since  the
adv.nt  of the  public  junior  secondary  schools in 1987. The  private  sector
owns 38  percent  of senior  secondary  schools  too  (see  Table  5  below).99 -
TABLE  S
PROVISIONAL  LIST  OF INSTITUTIONS  IN  THE  DIFFERENT  LEVELS  OF
EDUCATION  AND  THE  RELATIVE  SHARE  OF THE PRIVATE  SECTOR  (MAY  1988)
Level  :  Total  Publicly  Owned :  Privateiy  Owned
…--  ;…  ,  :---
:Nursery/Kindergarten  3,003  :  2,758  (92%)  :  245 (8%)
:Primary  :  6,000  5,790  (96.5%)  210 (1.5%)
:Junior  Secondary  Sch.  :  4,356  4,356  (100%)
:Senior  Sec/Commercial  379  236  (62%)  :  143 (38%)
:Technical/Vocational  :  108  28 (26%)  :  80 (74%)
:Teacher  Training  35  :  35 (100%)
:Special  Education  :  10  10 (100%)
Universities  &
:Diploma  Awarding
:Institutions  :  t  11 (100%)
TOTAL  :  13,902  13,224  (95%)  678 (5%)
Source: Ministry  of Education  and  Culture
It is  estimated  that  85  percent  of the  privately  owned
institutions  are  located  in  the  more  developed  southern  region. The
private  sector  accounted  for  seven  percent  of the  employment  in education.
The  private  sector's  role  in formal  education  activities,  however,  does  not
take  into  account  the  significant  role  being  played  by rural  communities  in
setting  up informal  local  schools  through  self  help.  Churches  and  other
nongovernmental  organizations  (NGOs)  are  active  in  this  endeavor,  but  no
data  are  available  on the  size  and  spread  of such  voluntary  educational
efforts  in the  country.- 100 -
ANNEX III
INVESTMENT  CODE.  1985
Section  16
ENTERPRISES  WHOLLY  RESERVED  FOR  GHANAIANS
1.  Any enterprise  concerned  with  retail  or  wholesale  trade,  unless
such  business  is  carried  on  by or within  a department  store  or a
supermarket  which  has  an employed  capital  of not  less  than
US$500,000.00.
2.  The  sale  of anything  whatsoever  in  any  market,  petty  trading.
hawking  or selling  from  a  kiosk  at  any  place.
3.  Business  representation  for  foreign  companies  unless  the
enterprise  has an employed  capital  of not less  than  five  hundred
thousand  United  States  dollars  (US$500,000.00)  or its  equivalent.
4.  Operation  of taxi  service  and  car  hire service.
5.  The sale  under  hire-purchase  contract  of motor  vehicles  including
taxis  or  vehicles  intended  to  be used in the  operation  of taxi
service  or  a  car  hire  service.
6.  PRoduce  brokerage  unless  the  employed  capital  of the  enterprise  is
not  less  than  US$500,000.00.
7.  Advertising  agencies  and  public  relations  business.
8.  All  aspects  of pool  betting  business  and  lotteries.
9.  Estate  agency.
10.  Travel  agency.
11.  Lighterage  services.
12.  Commercial  transportation  of passenger  by land.
13.  Bakery.
14.  Manufacture  of articles  from  foam  materials.
15.  Operation  of  beauty  saloons  a.  )arbers'  shops.- 101
16.  Manufacture  of cement  blocks  for  sale.
17.  Manufacture  of tailoring  or  both of garments  other  than  for
export.
18.  Textile  screen  hand  printing  (including  tie  and  dye).
19.  Tyre ret  -ading.
20.  Manufacture  of suitcases,  briefcases,  portfolios,  handbags,
shopping  bags,  purses,  wallets  other  than  for  export.PPR  Working  Pape.  Series
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